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Energy, Governance, and Market 
Mechanisms 
ALICE KASWAN* 
As climate modelers’ projections materialize through in-
tense storms, catastrophic flooding, unprecedented heat 
waves, and more, the need for substantial decarbonization 
within the next few decades has become increasingly clear. 
Transitioning to clean energy will bring benefits and draw-
backs and will create winners and losers. Who will decide 
how we transition? Our choice of policy tools will have sig-
nificant implications for who controls the transition and how 
it unfolds. 
Many economists promote the role of market-based 
mechanisms like carbon taxes or cap-and-trade, mecha-
nisms that rely largely on private actors to make crucial de-
cisions. Under this view, government measures would fill in 
as necessary; they would complement market-based decar-
bonization mechanisms. 
Although market advocates treat the autonomy of private 
decisions as one of the market’s central virtues, I argue that 
that approach could shortchange collective deliberation on 
critical questions about our future path. I argue that govern-
ment-driven climate action planning and prescriptive strat-
egies should play a central role. Governmental institutions 
have the capacity to engage in expansive deliberation over 
the many values and tradeoffs at stake, the capacity for long-
term planning, and a greater capacity for public engagement 
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and democratic accountability than atomized decision-mak-
ing in the energy marketplace. In this view, a carbon pricing 
mechanism could play an important role—but one that com-
plements governance rather than the other way around. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change challenges the status quo. In the long term, ex-
perts agree that decarbonization is necessary1 and suggest that, to 
avoid climate catastrophe, the United States should reduce green-
house gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.2 A compre-
hensive assessment of specific pathways to reach that goal by the 
Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project anticipates that “[t]he car-
bon intensity of electricity must be reduced by at least 97% . . . .”3 
Over the next few decades, transitioning to clean electricity will 
have widespread implications across society, with benefits and 
drawbacks, winners and losers.4 
Energy infrastructure decisions made now will have long-term 
and short-term consequences.5 In the long term, it matters whether 
utilities invest in natural gas, locking in reliance on fossil fuels for 
decades, or instead invest primarily in low- or no-carbon alternatives 
that would accelerate a clean energy transition.6 In the shorter term, 
how we transition has widespread consequences not only for green-
                                                                                                             
 1 See OTTMAR EDENHOFER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 20 (2014), https://www.ipcc.
ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymak-
ers.pdf; see also John C. Dernbach, Creating Legal Pathways to a Zero-Carbon 
Future, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10780, 10780–83 (2016) (summarizing the scientific 
evidence showing the need for drastic carbon emission reductions). 
 2 See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 1614, 1632 (2014); JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON., 
INC., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
8 (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US_
Deep_Decarbonization_Policy_Report.pdf (stating that the United States govern-
ment has set a goal of reducing carbon to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050). 
 3 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 10. The deep decarbonization study in-
dicates that electricity-sector emissions must move from 500 g CO2/kWh in 2014 
to less than 15 g CO2 in 2050. Id. at 49. 
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 See infra Section I.B. 
 6 See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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house gas emissions but for their associated co-pollutants, like mer-
cury and particulates from coal-fired power plants.7 From a socio-
economic perspective, energy choices will intensely impact oppor-
tunities across the nation, from the coal mines facing waning de-
mand to urban centers investing in weatherization.8 The structure of 
the electricity sector is facing unprecedented change as large cen-
tralized utilities confront a dramatic increase in distributed re-
sources, like rooftop solar, dispersed wind power, and consumer ef-
ficiency.9 
Who will decide how we transition? Both the “who” and the 
“how” are critical. As for “who,” what roles should private market 
players and governance institutions play? Under a carbon price, set 
through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program, private actors se-
lect what they view as the most efficacious mechanisms.10 Under a 
more governance-centered approach, government institutions play a 
greater role in envisioning and prescribing a future pathway.11 And, 
as for “how” we transition, to what degree do we rely upon private 
actors’ individual decisions in response to price signals, and to what 
degree do we engage in more sustained and government-driven 
long-term planning that charts a course toward decarbonization?12 
Market advocates argue for the primacy of a carbon price, with 
complementary government-driven “prescriptive measures” only to 
the degree necessary to address potential market failures.13 In con-
trast, I suggest that long-term comprehensive planning for decarbon-
ization, and some degree of prescriptive measures to achieve it, will 
be essential and desirable, and that market measures could then 
complement more direct decarbonization strategies. Few would 
deny the need for both governance and market-based approaches; 
the question is the relative primacy of these mechanisms.14 
                                                                                                             
 7 See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra Section II.A. 
 11 See infra Section II.B. 
 12 See infra Section III.B. 
 13 See infra Section II.A.3. 
 14 See infra Section IV.B. 
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In California, for example, the foundation for the state’s climate 
action is its comprehensive agency-led planning process. This pro-
cess has been supplemented by more specific legislative and agency 
initiatives that direct the state toward a sustainable pathway and in-
tegrate economic, equity, and environmental considerations.15 Cali-
fornia has adopted limits on coal-fired power, stringent renewables 
requirements, and ever-increasing energy-efficient building stand-
ards.16 The state is also directing the benefits of a clean energy tran-
sition to disadvantaged communities by committing to renewable 
energy development and revenue deployment in disadvantaged 
communities.17 
California does have a cap-and-trade program,18  which comple-
ments these prescriptive measures by establishing an emissions cap 
backstop, filling gaps, providing a modest ongoing reduction incen-
tive, and generating revenue that is reinvested in climate action and 
equity initiatives. Instead of planning and prescriptive measures 
complementing cap-and-trade, the state’s cap-and-trade program 
complements the state’s planning and prescriptive agenda.19 Alt-
hough California’s efforts have not yet attempted to reach electric-
ity-sector decarbonization, its model—planning and governmental 
direction, coupled with a market-based price signal—demonstrates 
the viability of a governance-driven melding of prescriptive and 
market mechanisms.20 
But some suggest that a carbon price should be the central cli-
mate policy mechanism and that governments should hold back on 
more direct measures.21 In comments on Europe’s multifaceted cli-
mate policies, economist Robert Stavins has argued that the Euro-
peans should achieve reductions through cap-and-trade and forego 
renewables and energy efficiency policies.22 Economists tout the 
                                                                                                             
 15 See infra Section IV.C. 
 16 See infra notes 458–62 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 475–80 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra note 466 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 467–69 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra Section IV.C. 
 21 See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 22 Robert Stavins, Will Europe Scrap Its Renewables Target? That Would Be 
Good News for the Economy and for the Environment, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 
18, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-stavins/will-europe-
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benefits of market mechanisms, like cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, 
that let private entities make the hard choices.23 Market advocates 
point out that market mechanisms have multiple benefits: they in-
ternalize the external costs of pollution, they are cost-effective, they 
induce innovation and transformation, and they shift time and re-
source-intensive decision-making from overworked government 
agencies to the private entities that know their industries best.24 On 
this view, except for designing and operating the market-based sys-
tem, government institutions should leave most key substantive de-
cisions to the private sector.25 More prescriptive government mech-
anisms could potentially undermine the benefits of market-based 
mechanisms, and so substantive, complementary government 
measures should be adopted only where markets will be ineffec-
tual.26 
In contrast, I argue that the invisible hand of the market cannot 
and should not be the prime driver for achieving decarbonization; 
government institutions are best placed to make the fundamental po-
litical and practical decisions decarbonization requires. Legisla-
tures, state energy commissions, state public utility commissions 
(PUCs), and federal energy agencies should continue to step up and 
address the transition ahead. Government institutions have the ca-
pacity to engage in multifaceted decision-making that can address 
the wide range of environmental and socioeconomic benefits and 
tradeoffs associated with a clean energy transition.27 And, although 
utilities, power companies, transmission organizations and other 
electricity-sector players do engage in some degree of long-term 
                                                                                                             
scrap-its-ren_b_4624482.html [hereinafter Stavins, Will Europe Scrap Its Renew-
ables Target?]. David Driesen has observed that economists’ concerns about the 
impact of renewables mandates on the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) may have influenced the EU to refrain from enacting a stricter 
renewables policy. See David M. Driesen, Emissions Trading Versus Pollution 
Taxes: Playing “Nice” with Other Instruments, 48 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 27–28), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2985669 (noting that policy papers arguing that renewables policies interfere with 
a least-cost market-based approach have sparked a debate about rescinding re-
newables policies in Australia). 
 23 See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra Section II.A.2. 
 25 See infra note 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra Section II.A.3. 
 27 See infra Section III.A. 
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planning, it is not at the scale necessary to achieve decarboniza-
tion.28 Rather than waiting for private action, government institu-
tions should actively engage in the planning and coordination nec-
essary to transform the electricity sector.29 Government initiative is 
also necessary to the degree that private entities might fail to take 
decarbonization strategies, like distributed generation or energy ef-
ficiency, that could potentially compromise their current business 
models.30 
Government institutions also have democratic and process ben-
efits.31 At least relative to privatized decision-making, legislative 
and agency decision-making offer opportunities for public partici-
pation and increase the democratic legitimacy of decarbonization 
pathways.32 And, although “cost-effective” and flexible market 
mechanisms have been designed in part to attract business support 
for carbon controls, their uneven uptake suggests that a different po-
litical strategy may be in order.33 Efforts to develop a long-term vi-
sion for a clean energy future could potentially garner more political 
support than mechanisms that are framed primarily in terms of an 
economy-threatening “price.”34 
Of course, government decision-making is not without its 
risks.35 A government role does not ensure a just, clean energy tran-
sition.36 Vested interests with significant political power could prop 
up unsustainable energy choices. Indeed, the Trump Administra-
tion’s desire to reinvigorate the coal industry and promote fossil 
fuels provides a case in point.37 For those committed to long-term 
                                                                                                             
 28 See infra Section III.B.2. 
 29 See infra Section III. 
 30 See infra Section III.C. 
 31 See infra Section III.D. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See infra Section III.E. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See infra Section III.F. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Trump Administration Has New En-
ergy Buzzword, WASH. POST (May 25, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/05/25/the-energy-
202-trump-administration-has-new-energy-buzzword/5925c045e9b69b2fb981
db8a/?utm_term=.d74e1569676f; see also Daniel Cusick, Trump in Iowa Praises 
‘Beautiful’ Coal, Criticizes Wind, CLIMATEWIRE (June 22, 2017), https://www.ee-
news.net/climatewire/stories/1060056425/print. 
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decarbonization and a just transition, significant engagement in po-
litical and administrative settings will be necessary to avoid the risk 
of distorted government decision-making.38 
Though I argue that governance should not be considered a mere 
“complement” to market mechanisms, market mechanisms could 
nonetheless complement government decision-making, as they do 
in California.39 Given the importance of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, some redundancy and overlap would be more likely to 
achieve climate goals than reliance on a single instrument.40 If gov-
ernment decision-making proves incomplete, or ends up skewed to-
ward unsustainable fossil fuels, then a price on carbon, while un-
likely to be sufficient, could nonetheless provide at least a partial 
safety net.41 In a cap-and-trade program, an emissions cap could es-
tablish a backstop limit to emissions, whatever the fate of prescrip-
tive measures.42 Under a carbon tax, the tax would provide an ongo-
ing incentive for utilities and power companies to reduce emissions, 
whatever the effectiveness of government programs.43 Under either 
approach, having a price on carbon generates revenue that could be 
used to further reduce emissions and adapt to climate change.44 
Although these issues were recently front and center as states 
worked to comply with the Obama Administration’s Clean Power 
Plan (CPP) for controlling power plant greenhouse gas emissions,45 
the likely demise of that rule46 might lead some to question whether 
                                                                                                             
 38 See infra notes 382–83 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra Section IV.C. 
 40 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 41 See infra note 412 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 393–96, 467 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 397–98 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 399–403 and accompanying text. 
 45 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be cod-
ified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 46 Under the Obama Administration, litigation over the CPP had already led 
to a Supreme Court stay of EPA implementation of the CPP in February 2016. 
Robert Barnes & Steven Mufson, Supreme Court Freezes Obama Plan to Limit 
Carbon Emissions, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-freezes-obama-plan-to-limit-car-
bon-emissions/2016/02/09/ac9dfad8-cf85-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story.html?
utm_term=.37a8f35c1250. Now, President Trump has initiated efforts to repeal 
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these policy questions remain salient. Whatever happens at the fed-
eral level, however, the states continue to play a vital role in energy 
choices and have the opportunity to continue the momentum gener-
ated by the CPP.47 In doing so, the states will face the same choices 
among regulatory and market mechanisms they contemplated in 
their previous CPP planning efforts. 
Alternatively, some may argue that the debate is unnecessary 
because a clean energy transformation is already underway48 and 
that further government initiatives—with whatever mix of market 
mechanisms or government measures—are unnecessary. Existing 
markets are moving away from coal and toward natural gas and re-
newables.49 Renewables investments are growing rapidly,50 and the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts that, with federal 
tax credits, wind and solar power will be competitive with fossil fuel 
sources in 2022.51 However, reliance on renewables entails costs in 
addition to the generation itself, including transmission, storage, and 
back-up generation capacity that could increase the net cost of re-
newables.52 Moreover, cost alone does not determine investments; 
                                                                                                             
the CPP. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sta-
tionary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed 
Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 60); see also Andrew Childers, Clean 
Power Plan Review Tests EPA’s Climate Change Obligations, BLOOMBERG (June 
9, 2017), https://www.bna.com/clean-power-plan-n73014453126/ (noting that 
EPA has sent a proposal to reconsider the CPP to the White House Office of Man-
agement and Budget); see also Hannah Hess, Greens Search for Silver Linings in 
Executive Action, GREENWIRE (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/green-
wire/2017/03/28/stories/1060052207 (noting Executive Order asking EPA to re-
view the Clean Power Plan and other environmental regulations). 
 47 See Hess, supra note 46 (suggesting that state actions to control power 
plant emissions that were initiated under the CPP are likely to continue); Emily 
Holden & Daniel Cusick, Regulators Still Planning for CO2 Cuts, Despite 
Trump’s Order, CLIMATEWIRE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/cli-
matewire/stories/1060052460 (same). 
 48 See, e.g., infra notes 220–29 (describing multiple state and local clean en-
ergy generation initiatives). 
 49 See, e.g., infra notes 97–98 (sources describing transition). 
 50 Renewables are predicted to have the fastest percentage growth. See U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 10 (2017), https://
www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf. 
 51 Id. at 85–86 (basing prediction on the levelized cost of electricity). 
 52 See David. B. Spence, Paradoxes of “Decarbonization”, 82 BROOK. L. 
REV. 447, 469–70 (2017) [hereinafter Spence, Paradoxes]. 
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as discussed below, generation investments are affected by multiple 
factors, including certainty in obtaining an adequate rate of return 
on investment, access to transmission, the presence or absence of 
tax incentives (and their certainty), and the momentum associated 
with existing infrastructure.53 By 2040, and in absolute terms, the 
EIA predicts that natural gas production will increase the most, to 
levels significantly higher than renewables.54 Thus, even if existing 
energy investments appear to be trending toward decarbonization, it 
is unwise to assume that this trend will simply continue or will pro-
ceed at the rate necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change.55 
The Article differs from several other “governance” strands in 
the energy law literature. Shelley Welton and Joe Tomain each ex-
plore the democratic potential inherent in a clean energy transition, 
with Welton analyzing and assessing the various strands of partici-
pation that characterize calls for “energy democracy,”56 and Tomain 
lauding the opportunities for local and citizen control associated 
with new, more distributed energy options.57 In addition, William 
Boyd and Ann Carlson have explored the critical governance roles 
that PUCs can play in decarbonization efforts.58 In contrast to these 
scholars’ focus on specific types of public engagement, I focus on 
the role of public governance (whether legislative, administrative, 
                                                                                                             
 53 See infra notes 323–27 and accompanying text (describing factors affect-
ing generation investment decisions). 
 54 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 50, at 13. 
 55 See, e.g., Christa Marshall, DOE Study Shows Rapid Growth, but Trouble 
Looms, GREENWIRE (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/08/
08/stories/1060058528 (noting increased development of wind resources, but ob-
serving that development will likely slow when tax credits expire and if natural 
gas prices remain low). 
 56 See Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5–6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2935331. Welton unpacks the three forms of democratic partic-
ipation underlying recent calls for energy democracy: (1) consumer choice; (2) 
increased local control; and (3) access to existing processes. See id. 
 57 Joseph P. Tomain, The Democratization of Energy, 48 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1125, 1129–30 (2015). 
 58 William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking 
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 813–14 
(2016) (describing the critical role that state public utility commissions’ ratemak-
ing authority is playing in the nation’s transition to lower-carbon electricity); 
Boyd, supra note 2, at 1709–10 (recognizing and encouraging PUCs to fulfill their 
historic “public interest” mandate by fostering decarbonization). 
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or citizen-initiated) in relation to the private decision-making that 
characterizes market-based pollution control mechanisms.59 
Nor does the Article attempt to resolve challenging federalism 
questions. Because the federal government is not pursuing climate 
initiatives at the time of this writing, the Article assumes that states, 
or states acting together on a regional basis, will be the primary play-
ers.60 That does not mean that a federal role is not, or will not be, 
necessary to achieve decarbonization, especially given the reluc-
tance of some states to act and the important role that the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), and the Department of Energy play in influenc-
ing energy choices.61 Ideally, federal, regional, and state efforts 
would be coordinated if not integrated, but this Article does not at-
tempt to sketch the details of any such structure. 
Lastly, although a transition to a clean energy economy will 
touch many sectors, including transportation and heating, this Arti-
cle focuses on the electricity sector. Given a long history of govern-
ment regulation of utilities due to their quasi-monopoly character, 
governance in this sector presents unique opportunities and chal-
lenges that deserve separate treatment. In addition, although elec-
tricity generation currently accounts for just under 30% of the 
United States’ greenhouse gas emissions,62 its role in the economy 
is likely to increase as decarbonization efforts prompt increasing 
electrification of transportation and heating.63 
In Part I, I begin by briefly describing a range of options for 
transitioning to clean energy and their pervasive environmental, so-
cial, and economic consequences. Part II introduces the primary pol-
icy mechanisms for reducing carbon. It first describes market-based 
                                                                                                             
 59 This Article does not attempt to analyze the best institutional setting for 
developing transitional policy. An analysis of the political economy of legislative 
bodies and administrative agencies, and the many variables that could determine 
their relative suitability, is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. David B. Spence, 
Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 1029 (2017) [hereinafter 
Spence, Naïve Energy Markets] (suggesting a preference for agency action over 
legislative action). 
 60 See infra Section II.B.2.i. 
 61 See id. 
 62 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2015 ES-24 (2017). 
 63 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 8–10. 
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approaches to climate policy, including cap-and-trade programs and 
carbon taxes. It highlights the benefits of market-based mechanisms, 
and then explores market advocates’ criticisms of combined market 
and regulatory approaches. It then turns to prescriptive governance 
mechanisms, first explaining the governance structures that influ-
ence electricity-sector choices and then identifying the govern-
ment’s role in each of the key features of the electricity system: gen-
eration, transmission, distribution, and demand reduction. Part II 
ends by observing that, although the distinction between market-
based and prescriptive measures is more aptly seen as a continuum 
rather than a dichotomy, the starting point nonetheless matters. 
Part III explains why a government role in creating a long-term 
vision, and planning and implementing a clean energy transition, is 
desirable. Part III concludes by recognizing some of the potential 
drawbacks to government decision-making, including interest-
group capture, and emphasizes the critical importance of public en-
gagement to counter the potential influence of vested interests. 
Part IV then explores how market mechanisms could comple-
ment government measures by filling gaps, establishing a backstop, 
and by generating revenue. Part IV revisits and responds to market 
advocates’ concerns about the compatibility of prescriptive and mar-
ket measures. Lastly, to help envision what climate policy driven by 
prescriptive measures but backed up by market mechanisms could 
look like, Part IV introduces California’s multifaceted climate pol-
icy—not as a blueprint but as an example of the type of thoughtful 
governance that, complemented by market signals, can guide a clean 
electricity transition. 
I. A CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION 
What’s at stake in a transition to clean electricity? To answer 
that question, I begin by noting the primary practical mechanisms 
utilities or other actors could use to reduce electricity-sector emis-
sions. The review reveals the significant impacts these choices will 
have on the distribution of the costs and benefits of transition, as 
well as the speed with which we will accomplish the decarboniza-
tion necessary to avert catastrophic climate change. 
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A. The Path to Clean Energy 
No silver bullet will accomplish decarbonization; there are many 
ways to reduce carbon emissions, mechanisms that address both the 
supply of and the demand for electricity.64 Because coal combustion 
is carbon-intensive—burning coal generates more than twice the 
carbon per unit of energy as natural gas65—reducing coal combus-
tion is a key step to reducing carbon. Retiring coal-fired power 
plants and replacing their generation with less carbon-intensive 
sources is the most direct way to relinquish coal combustion.66 Even 
if not shut down, the interconnected nature of the electricity grid 
means that more generation could come from natural gas plants and 
less from coal-fired plants.67 In addition, fossil-fuel sources could 
continue to operate but be coupled with carbon capture and storage: 
                                                                                                             
 64 See JESSE D. JENKINS & SAMUEL THERNSTROM, ENERGY INNOVATION 
REFORM PROJECT, DEEP DECARBONIZATION OF THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR: 
INSIGHTS FROM RECENT LITERATURE 1 (2017), http://innovationreform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/EIRP-Deep-Decarb-Lit-Review-Jenkins-Thernstrom-
March-2017.pdf; see also WILLIAMS, ET AL., supra note 2, at 77–78 (table listing 
mechanisms); see generally JOHN RANDOLPH & GILBERT M. MASTERS, ENERGY 
FOR SUSTAINABILITY: TECHNOLOGY, PLANNING, POLICY 7–28 (2008). Needless 
to say, views on the appropriate mix of measures differ. 
 65 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, GREENHOUSE 
GAS MITIGATION MEASURES 3 – 4 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-11/documents/tsd-cpp-ghg-mitigation-measures.pdf [hereinafter 
GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION MEASURES] (stating that coal-fired power plants 
emit carbon at the rate of 2,217 lbs/MWh, in comparison with 905 lbs/MWh from 
combined cycle natural gas power plants). 
 66 For example, Nevada legislation required the state’s largest utility to retire 
a substantial amount of coal-fired power plants by 2019. See HAMPDEN MACBETH 
ET AL., GEO. CLIMATE CTR., STATE LEADERSHIP DRIVING THE SHIFT TO CLEAN 
ENERGY: 2016 UPDATE, 24 (2016), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/re-
port/Final_GCC_State_Leadership_Driving_the_Shift_to_Clean_Energy_
11Nov2016v2_1.pdf. 
 67 In developing the Clean Power Plan, EPA documented that many natural 
gas plants are substantially underutilized and that shifting generation from coal to 
natural gas plants could substantially reduce emissions. See GREENHOUSE GAS 
MITIGATION MEASURES, supra note 65, at 3 – 4 to – 11. Nationally, the average 
annual capacity factor, or extent to which a plant’s capacity is exercised, is 46%. 
See id. at 3 – 5 to – 6. The EIA assumes that natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) 
facilities can operate at 87% capacity, and data indicates that many could operate 
at 92% capacity. See id. 
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technology to divert carbon dioxide from the emissions stream, and 
then transport the captured carbon to underground storage sites.68 
Because natural gas emits less carbon than coal, greater invest-
ment in new natural gas generation is another possibility.69 As nat-
ural gas has become cheaper due to increased supply from hydraulic 
fracturing and coal has become more expensive due to new environ-
mental regulations, many utilities and power companies have been 
shifting investment to natural gas, even in the absence of direct car-
bon regulation or a carbon price.70 
Utilities and power companies could also invest in various forms 
of low- or no-carbon alternatives, including solar, wind, and nuclear 
power. Investments in renewable energy could take very different 
forms, from centralized utility-run solar or wind generation con-
nected to interstate transmission grids71 to distributed resources like 
household solar generation to microgrids operating at the neighbor-
hood or local levels.72 
Electricity-sector emissions are determined not only by choices 
among types of energy supply, but also by demand for electricity. 
Demand-side energy-efficiency measures, like better-insulated 
homes, south-facing windows, cool roofs, and more efficient appli-
                                                                                                             
 68 See RANDOLPH & MASTERS, supra note 64, at 373–74. For the purposes of 
this Article, I treat carbon capture and storage as a mechanism for decarboniza-
tion, even though it continues the combustion of fossil fuels. 
 69 JEFF DEYETTE ET AL., UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NATURAL GAS 
GAMBLE: A RISKY BET ON AMERICA’S CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE 13–14 (2015), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/natural-gas-gamble-
full-report.pdf. 
 70 See id. at 1, 5–6, 9–10; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO 
THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RELIABILITY 13, 24, 33 (2017), 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/08/f36/Staff%20Report%20on%20Elec-
tricity%20Markets%20and%20Reliability_0.pdf (observing the increase in reli-
ance on natural gas is due to its lower costs, the ease and efficiency of building 
efficient NGCC generating plants, and the higher relative costs of coal plants). 
 71 See RANDOLPH & MASTERS, supra note 64, at 461–88. 
 72 See ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY LAW 228–30 
(2017) (describing microgrids, some of which are being powered by renewables); 
Hannah J. Wiseman & Sara C. Bronin, Community-Scale Renewable Energy, 4 
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 165, 166 (2013). 
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ances and technology would all reduce the need for generating elec-
tricity, indirectly reducing emissions.73 In addition, mechanisms that 
reduce demand during peak periods through pricing or other incen-
tives could reduce the need to run polluting sources to meet peak 
demand and allow utilities to rely on less-polluting alternatives.74 
B. The Pervasive Consequences of Emission-Reduction Choices 
in the Electricity Sector 
Each of these choices has significant environmental, socioeco-
nomic, and political consequences that include and extend beyond 
reductions in greenhouse gases. The path to decarbonization is not 
simply a technical question; it will require a multitude of complex 
policy and ethical choices.75 These choices differ in the degree to 
which they provide a glide path to long-term decarbonization, and 
they differ in their more immediate impacts and their socioeconomic 
implications. The literature on energy alternatives and their implica-
tions is vast; here, I survey a few examples to illustrate the long- and 
short-term repercussions of energy choices. 
As noted above, decarbonization will likely be necessary in the 
long term, with many suggesting that greenhouse gas emissions 
should be reduced to 80% below 1990 levels by 205076 and that we 
must achieve a 97% reduction in electricity-sector emissions.77 En-
ergy investment decisions made today could have long-term impacts 
on the shape of our energy future.78 The Deep Decarbonization 
                                                                                                             
 73 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 213–62 (describing energy effi-
ciency for buildings). 
 74 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 219–20 (describing energy-effi-
ciency initiatives); RANDOLPH & MASTERS, supra note 64, at 396–97 (describing 
demand-side management to lower demand and reduce emissions). 
 75 See BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL ET AL., ENERGY SECURITY, EQUALITY, AND 
JUSTICE 128 (2014) (arguing that energy choices implicate fundamental questions 
of social justice); David Roberts, 5 Reasons There’s More to Climate Policy than 
a Price on Carbon, VOX (June 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/
6/28/12045860/carbon-tax (describing multiplicity of values that a clean energy 
transition will implicate); Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 3–4, 20) (“The 
question of how to transform energy is one of values . . . .”). 
 76 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. 
 77 See id. at 10. 
 78 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes, “Infrastructure de-
velopments and long-lived products that lock societies into greenhouse gas-inten-
sive emissions pathways may be difficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the 
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study suggests that as existing infrastructure reaches the end of its 
useful life, all new investment should promote decarbonization.79 
Because many components of electricity infrastructure, like power 
plants, pipelines, and transmission lines, have long life spans, failing 
to replace these existing fossil fuel sources with non-fossil fuel 
sources would perpetuate reliance on fossil fuels.80 For example, alt-
hough some continued investment in natural gas may be warranted 
to avoid continued coal use,81 the Deep Decarbonization study tells 
us that “[p]olicies that produce incremental changes without facili-
tating transformation can lead to technology lock-in and emissions 
reduction dead ends that make deep decarbonization by mid-century 
unattainable.”82 
                                                                                                             
importance of early action for ambitious mitigation.” EDENHOFER, supra note 1, 
at 18. 
 79 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 10. 
 80 Once long-term investments in fossil fuels and fossil-fuel infrastructure are 
made, efforts to require increasingly stringent carbon reductions that necessitate 
shutting down assets before the end of their useful lives would encounter stiff 
political resistance and would likely be very expensive. See id. at 7. 
 81 David Spence notes that, if regions with little natural gas capacity invest in 
renewables, they could end up using coal rather than natural gas as an inefficient 
and heavily polluting back-up fuel to maintain reliability. Spence, Paradoxes, su-
pra note 52, at 462, 474. Thus, when determining appropriate investments, deci-
sion-makers must consider the full emissions profile necessary to achieve reliable 
service. 
 82 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 52–54, 85 (noting that, by 2050, natural 
gas should be used only to play a very limited back-up role for lower-carbon 
sources, and that an overall conversion from coal to natural gas would fail to 
achieve a sufficient transformation); see DEYETTE ET AL., supra note 69, at 14–
15; Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Mark Chediak, Natural Gas Moves to the Naughty List, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-04-20/natural-gas-moves-to-the-naughty-list. While some call natural 
gas a “bridge” fuel to a low-carbon future, others suggest that investing in natural 
gas is more like walking a gangplank,” because natural gas production results in 
leaks of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, and because current investments in 
natural gas would lock in our reliance on fossil fuels for decades to come. Com-
pare Richard J. Pierce, Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 
32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 245 (2012), with Zeke Hausfather, Is Natural Gas 
a Bridge Fuel?, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.
yaleclimateconnections.org/2016/08/is-natural-gas-a-bridge-fuel/, and Anthony 
R. Ingraffea, Opinion, Gangplank to a Warm Future, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013), 
https://nyti.ms/13RSWIf (describing risks from methane leaks). 
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Energy choices also have a wide range of short-term environ-
mental and socioeconomic impacts. Most obviously, emission re-
duction strategies vary significantly in the degree of greenhouse gas 
reduction they would achieve.83 For example, switching to natural 
gas would reduce greenhouse gas emissions relative to coal but not 
by as much as zero-emission renewable energy sources like solar 
and wind power.84 
Greenhouse gas reduction strategies will also significantly im-
plicate air pollution caused by co-pollutants. For example, reducing 
reliance on coal will improve air quality because coal combustion 
emits much more pollution per unit of energy than natural gas, not-
withstanding recent efforts to control coal pollution.85 Similarly, alt-
hough natural gas generates much less pollution than coal, natural 
gas combustion nonetheless has co-pollutant consequences for local 
and regional air quality,86 and hydraulic fracking may cause local-
ized air pollution releases.87 Biomass combustion for electricity, 
though sometimes considered neutral from a carbon perspective, 
generates co-pollutants.88 Although electricity generation from solar 
and wind energy has much lower co-pollutant consequences, there 
                                                                                                             
 83 See Dlouhy & Chediak, supra note 82. 
 84 See id. From a lifecycle perspective, the construction of renewables does 
generate carbon emissions, but the subsequent operation of these resources is 
largely zero-emission. See 2 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE 
ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY 10-47 to -48 (M.M. Hand et al. eds., 2012), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-2.pdf; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 
AND USE 139, 143 (2010). 
 85 A report by the National Research Council found that the co-pollutant dam-
ages associated with coal-fired power plants are 3.2 cents per kWh, in comparison 
with mean damages of 0.16 cents per kWh for natural gas power plants. See NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 7–8, 87–99 (detailing air pollution conse-
quences of coal-fired power). 
 86 See id. at 112–13, 116–23. 
 87 See DEYETTE ET AL., supra note 69, at 18; Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and 
Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 803 (2013). 
 88 See RICHARD L. BAIN ET AL., BIOPOWER TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT: STATE 
OF THE INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY 6-1 to -7 (2003), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy03osti/33123.pdf; M.M. Rahman et al., Environmental Impact Assessment of 
Different Renewable Energy Resources: A Recent Development, in CLEAN 
ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS OF 
NEW APPROACHES 29, 40–55 (Mohammad G. Rasul et al. eds., 2017) (providing 
lifecycle analysis of biofuels and biogas). 
494 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:476 
 
are short-term greenhouse gas and air-quality consequences associ-
ated with constructing and installing these technologies.89 
These choices present non-air environmental concerns as well. 
To name a few, fracking for natural gas could jeopardize water qual-
ity.90 Coal-mining has significant impacts on industry workers, land-
scapes, and water quality.91 Wind turbines jeopardize bird and bat 
populations,92 and wind, centralized solar, and hydropower regu-
larly confront tensions with protecting endangered species.93 Nu-
clear presents radiation and terrorism risks in mining and operation, 
and there is still no long-term secure solution for nuclear waste.94 
The list goes on. 
Energy choices have significant socioeconomic as well as envi-
ronmental consequences. Reducing reliance on coal means that re-
gions heavily dependent on coal, like some mid-Atlantic states and 
the Midwest, could lose the industry that has defined regional em-
ployment and identity for generations.95 At the same time, new de-
                                                                                                             
 89 See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 84, at 10-47 to -48 (de-
scribing minor lifecycle greenhouse gases from solar power development); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 139, 143 (outlining emissions associated 
with the production and transport of wind turbines and noting that solar manufac-
turing uses toxic materials and is energy-intensive). 
 90 The extent to which injecting fracking fluids into shale formations poses a 
water quality threat is highly contested. See Wiseman, supra note 87, at 738–41. 
Regardless of the level of risk posed by fluid injection, Wiseman notes that frack-
ing presents numerous additional water quality risks throughout the fracking cy-
cle. See id. at 741–808. 
 91 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 75–82. 
 92 See id. at 139–40 (describing wind power’s threats to bird and bat popula-
tions). 
 93 See Kalyani Robbins, Responsible, Renewable, and Redesigned: How the 
Renewable Energy Movement Can Make Peace with the Endangered Species Act, 
15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 555, 560–61 (2014); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversi-
fying America’s Energy Future: The Future of Renewable Wind Power, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 505, 530–31 (2008) (describing environmental risks posed by wind 
power). 
 94 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 127–31 (describing 
environmental risks associated with nuclear power). 
 95 Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environ-
mental and Social Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 
304, 334 (2013); Francine Kiefer, In Coal-Mining Kentucky, Shock and Dismay 
over Clean Power Plan’s New Targets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 4, 2015), 
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velopment, whether fracking, wind farms, energy efficiency, or oth-
erwise, could bring new employment opportunities and resources.96 
Indeed, according to some studies, renewable energy and energy ef-
ficiency create more jobs per unit of energy than fossil fuels.97 In 
addition, certain alternatives present at least some potential to spread 
opportunities to the communities struggling the most, whether it is 
fracking in the Rust Belt or energy efficiency jobs in the urban 
core.98 
The cost of energy choices also has short- and long-term impacts 
on the economy in general. Because most manufacturing and com-
mercial uses rely on electricity, increasing electricity costs could 
have ripple effects throughout these sectors. Increased costs could 
have negative distributional impacts on poor households, which de-
vote a larger share of income to electricity costs than wealthier 
households.99 Thus, cost-effective policies are desirable to reduce 
                                                                                                             
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/0804/In-coal-mining-Kentucky-
shock-and-dismay-over-Clean-Power-Plan-s-new-targets. 
 96 See, e.g., Richard Martin, The One and Only Texas Wind Boom, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602468/the-one-and-
only-texas-wind-boom/ (describing how wind farms, facilitated by the state’s in-
vestment in transmission lines, have brought new economic opportunities to strug-
gling west Texas farmers). 
 97 Max Wei et al., Putting Renewables and Energy Efficiency to Work: How 
Many Jobs Can the Clean Energy Industry Generate in the US?, 38 ENERGY 
POL’Y 919, 928 (2010) (finding that “all renewable energy and low carbon sources 
generate more jobs than the fossil fuel sector per unit of energy . . . . [e]nergy 
efficiency investment offers a high payoff in induced jobs”); Daniel Lopez, Fact 
Sheet: Jobs in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, ENVTL. & ENERGY 
STUDY INST. (Feb. 2017), http://www.eesi.org/files/FactSheet_REEE_Jobs_
021517.pdf. Energy-sector employment claims are not without controversy. See, 
e.g., Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 573 & n.2 
(2017) (describing studies and claims on renewable energy and jobs). Notwith-
standing the controversies, it is clear that a clean energy transition will have em-
ployment consequences worth considering in the development of energy policy. 
 98 See VAN JONES, THE GREEN-COLLAR ECONOMY: HOW ONE SOLUTION 
CAN FIX OUR TWO BIGGEST PROBLEMS 9 (2008); Nelson D. Schwartz, Boom in 
Energy Spurs Industry in the Rust Belt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/an-energy-boom-lifts-the-heart-
land.html; Kate Sheppard, The Green Gap, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 18, 2008), 
http://prospect.org/article/green-gap (discussing green jobs in the inner city). 
 99 See ARIEL DREHOBL & LAUREN ROSS, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY 
EFFICIENT ECON., LIFTING THE HIGH ENERGY BURDEN IN AMERICA’S LARGEST 
CITIES: HOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY CAN IMPROVE LOW INCOME AND 
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negative impacts on the economy and reduce disproportionate im-
pacts on low-income communities. 
Options that rely on dispersed resources, like distributed energy 
generation or energy efficiency, could have additional socioeco-
nomic impacts. Once renewables or energy-efficiency measures are 
installed, they can reduce household energy costs. To the extent 
these options require a certain degree of wealth to access, then they 
could be available to and benefit wealthier households more than the 
poorer households who need them most.100 Climate justice advo-
cates argue that all should have access to the benefits of distributed 
resources.101 Meanwhile, as increasing numbers of households and 
businesses install distributed solar and contribute less to utilities, the 
question of who could be left “holding the bag” of fixed utility in-
frastructure costs is looming large.102 
In the energy world, maintaining reliability is a central con-
cern.103 Certain options, like coal, natural gas, and nuclear power, 
provide steady baseload power at all times. Other resources, like so-
lar and wind, are more variable. Energy choices could thus require 
new mechanisms, like increased energy storage or widespread grid 
                                                                                                             
UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES 3–6, 8–9 (2016), http://energyefficien-
cyforall.org/sites/default/files/Lifting%20the%20High%20Energy%20Bur-
den_0.pdf (finding that low-income households spend a disproportionately 
greater percentage of their income on electricity bills); Diana Hernández & Ste-
phen Bird, Energy Burden and the Need for Integrated Low-Income Housing and 
Energy Policy, 2 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (2010) (same). 
 100 Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 863–64; Welton, supra note 56 (manu-
script at 33). 
 101 See BEN BOVARNICK & DARRYL BANKS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STATE 
POLICIES TO INCREASE LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES’ ACCESS TO SOLAR POWER 
(2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Low
IncomeSolar-brief.pdf; Deborah Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 
VILL. L. REV. 25, 35 (2013); Welton, supra note 97, at 573–74, 573 n.4, 594–95. 
 102 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 864. 
 103 Reliability refers to both having sufficient energy supply to meet customer 
demand and maintaining transmission-line functionality, which can be under-
mined if supply and demand are not properly balanced. See Amy L. Stein, Recon-
sidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 697, 700, 710–12 (2014). 
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integration, to ensure reliability from sources that are inherently in-
termittent.104 
Different energy choices also have significant implications for 
the structure of the energy industry. Continued investment in coal, 
natural gas, nuclear power, or utility-scale renewables retains con-
trol in existing large utilities and fossil fuel companies and retains 
the model of centralized power distributed on the grid.105 More dis-
tributed opportunities, whether distributed solar and wind power or 
consumers’ energy efficiency, disrupt the existing model of central-
ized control by large utilities,106 potentially transferring more power 
and control to citizens and local governments.107 These choices have 
important implications for how energy would be managed and reg-
ulated. Recognizing the degree to which energy choices dictate who 
has power and control over the energy system highlights the political 
stakes of our energy choices. 
                                                                                                             
 104 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 70, at 73, 126 (describing current 
trends and future reliability challenges); Stein, supra note 103, at 715 (describing 
how energy storage could facilitate the integration of intermittent renewable en-
ergy by capturing extra energy when renewable generation is high and releasing 
that power when renewable generation is low); Robert Fares, Renewable Energy 
Intermittency Explained: Challenges, Solutions, and Opportunities, SCI. AM.: 
PLUGGED IN (Mar. 11, 2015), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/re-
newable-energy-intermittency-explained-challenges-solutions-and-opportuni-
ties/ (explaining how a sufficiently large number and diverse array of renewable 
generators can even out the intermittency associated with individual renewable 
sources). 
 105 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 13 (describing centralized gen-
eration and transmission). 
 106 See Tomain, supra note 57, at 1136; see also AL WEINRUB & ANTHONY 
GIANCATARINO, TOWARD A CLIMATE JUSTICE ENERGY PLATFORM: 
DEMOCRATIZING OUR ENERGY FUTURE 8–10 (2015), http://www.lo-
calcleanenergy.org/files/Climate%20Justice%20Energy%20Platform.pdf; Wel-
ton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 22). 
 107 See Tomain, supra note 57, at 1138–39 (arguing that distributed renewable 
energy and consumer energy efficiency allow control over electricity choices to 
shift from utilities and power companies to more decentralized community and 
citizen control); see also JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, CLEAN POWER POLITICS: THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF ENERGY 193–213 (2017). Utilities fear that these shifts 
will send them into a “death spiral,” as they lose the capacity to pay for large 
infrastructure investments. See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1676–77 (describing death 
spiral claims). 
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Van Jones has articulated the profound environmental, social, 
and economic implications of a clean energy transition. He states 
that “we have the chance to build this new energy economy in ways 
that reflect our deepest values of inclusion, diversity, and equal op-
portunity for everyone.”108 He observes that “[t]oday the ‘clean-
tech’ revolution and the transformation of our aging energy infra-
structure are poised to become the next great engines for American 
innovation, productivity and job growth, and social-equity gains.”109 
With so much at stake, both positively and negatively, it matters 
who decides how we decarbonize. 
II. POLICY MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE DECARBONIZATION 
There are a wide range of policy mechanisms for accomplishing 
the transition ahead. For the purposes of this Article, I focus on two 
categories: (1) government policies that rely on market signals to 
induce the private sector to achieve goals, and (2) government poli-
cies that use more direct planning and prescriptive measures to 
achieve goals.110 Although the sketch of these options implies a 
sharp dichotomy, I conclude by observing that actual policies often 
evince a blend of strategies, suggesting more of a continuum than a 
dichotomy. Even as a continuum, however, policymakers must con-
sider where on that continuum they choose to fall. 
                                                                                                             
 108 JONES, supra note 98, at 11. 
 109 Id. at 180. 
 110 Debates about the relative value of “markets” and “regulation” have a long 
history in energy law. See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 2; see generally 
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Cen-
tral Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339 
(1993); Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 974, 977. The classic 
debate is whether government should maintain a firm hand on the supply and dis-
tribution of electricity or whether a freer market in electricity supply would better 
assure reliable and affordable electricity. These debates have addressed the pro-
vision of electricity itself. In contrast, this Article assumes an environmental ob-
jective—decarbonization of electricity—and evaluates the relative roles of pre-
scriptive approaches, like requiring renewable energy, versus market-based regu-
latory tools, like pricing carbon, at achieving the desired environmental outcome. 
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A. Market-Based Approaches to Reducing                            
Electricity-Sector Emissions 
Whether in the context of climate change or other environmental 
problems, economists frequently advocate “market mechanisms.”111 
They argue that market mechanisms give private actors more auton-
omy in achieving a given environmental objective and can achieve 
the goal more efficiently—at the lowest cost and with the lowest 
administrative burden.112 In the climate context, the dominant mar-
ket mechanisms are cap-and-trade policies and carbon taxes.113 
1. INTRODUCTION TO MARKET-BASED EMISSION                
CONTROL MECHANISMS 
In cap-and-trade, the government determines the overall emis-
sion reduction goal and sets the emissions cap to match. Cap-and-
trade programs to reduce greenhouse gases are characterized by a 
long-term goal—like achieving 1990 levels by 2020. They usually 
establish a series of yearly caps that gradually move toward the ul-
timate emissions objective. The government entity managing the 
program generates “allowances” that represent the total emissions 
permitted in a given year. The managing agency either distributes 
these allowances to regulated entities for free, auctions the allow-
ances to purchasing entities, or a combination of the two. 
If the agency distributes allowances for free, then the agency 
would achieve emissions reductions by giving existing entities 
                                                                                                             
 111 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to 
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 296 (2008) [hereinafter 
Stavins, U.S. Cap-and-Trade System]; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, 
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1349–50 (1985); Daniel 
J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred Hob-
bled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234–36 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert 
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old 
Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 13 (1991). 
 112 I focus here on market mechanisms designed to curb emissions. Tax credits 
and subsidies designed to encourage lower-emitting sources arguably present an-
other type of “market mechanism.” I note the important role of tax credits for 
renewables below. See infra notes 238–43 and accompanying text. For the pur-
poses of this Article, however, I analyze only market policies designed to deter 
high emissions. 
 113 See Stavins, U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, supra note 111, at 296, 348. 
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fewer emissions allowances than necessary to cover current emis-
sions.114 Each regulated entity would then have three choices. First, 
it could reduce its emissions to match the number of allowances it 
received.115 Second, it could reduce its emissions by more than nec-
essary and sell the extra allowances for a profit.116 And third, it could 
keep emitting at the same level (or even increase emissions) and buy 
allowances to cover the emissions not accounted for by the initial 
allowance distribution.117 Option two (selling allowances) and op-
tion three (buying allowances) constitute the “trade” feature of cap-
and-trade programs. 
If the agency auctions allowances rather than distributing them 
for free, then regulated entities could purchase enough allowances 
to cover their emissions.118 If their actual emissions differ from the 
number of purchased allowances, then they could sell any excess, 
purchase any needed allowances from other entities, or purchase at 
allowance auctions held by the controlling agency.119 
Under a carbon tax, the government agency sets the tax rate.120 
Utilities and other regulated entities then factor that tax into their 
decision-making.121 The more they reduce emissions, the less tax 
they must pay; the more they maintain or increase emissions, the 
more tax they must pay. 
A carbon tax clearly generates a “carbon price” intended to in-
centivize emissions reductions,122 but so does a properly functioning 
cap-and-trade program.123 The carbon price in a cap-and-trade pro-
gram is determined by the relationship between the supply of and 
                                                                                                             
 114 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO 
DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION 
CONTROL 3-15 (2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-03/doc-
uments/tools.pdf [hereinafter TOOLS OF THE TRADE] (describing programs that 
have ratcheted down allowance allocations to achieve environmental objectives). 
 115 See Stavins, U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, supra note 111, at 298. 
 116 TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 114, at 1-3. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id. at 3-16. 
 119 See id. at 5-8 (describing allowance markets). 
 120 See id. at 2-6. 
 121 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., 
CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR CONGRESS 2 (2009). 
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. 
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demand for allowances.124 If the cap is close to existing emissions, 
or if there are many low-cost options for reducing emissions, then 
regulated entities will require few allowances and the carbon price 
will be low. If the cap is significantly below existing emissions or 
the cost of emissions reduction is high, then there will be more de-
mand for allowances relative to supply, and the carbon price will be 
higher. Thus, in a cap-and-trade program, the stringency of the cap 
and availability of low-cost emission reduction opportunities signif-
icantly impact the carbon price. 
2. THE BENEFITS OF MARKET-BASED EMISSION-CONTROL 
MECHANISMS 
From an economist’s viewpoint, carbon pricing meshes with the 
economics paradigm for defining the problem (pollution as an ex-
ternality) and conceptualizing its solution (internalizing the exter-
nality by placing a price on harm).125 Carbon taxes represent the 
most direct embodiment of the economics-based conception.126 Be-
cause cap-and-trade programs generate a carbon price, they simi-
larly fit within the economics paradigm. 
An essential benefit of market-based mechanisms is their cost-
effectiveness, which lowers the cost of achieving a given environ-
mental goal.127 The emissions cap establishes the environmental 
goal.128 Then, under a cap-and-trade program, generators that can 
reduce emissions cheaply will do so and sell excess emission allow-
ances to entities facing higher costs.129 Under a carbon tax, facilities 
that can reduce for less than the tax rate will reduce, while those 
facing costs higher than the tax rate will pay the tax. Thus, under 
                                                                                                             
 124 Cf. Stavins, U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, supra note 111, at 315–16 (ob-
serving that allowing entities to bank or borrow allowances would permit adjust-
ments in supply and demand that could reduce price volatility). 
 125 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81; Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 
supra note 59, at 989. 
 126 Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 1017. 
 127 See Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade 
and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 210 (2012) (observing 
that cap-trade programs are designed to “find the cheapest emissions reductions”); 
Hahn & Stavins, supra note 111, at 12–13; Stavins, U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, 
supra note 111, at 298. 
 128 See TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 114, at 3–8. 
 129 See Stavins, U.S. Cap and Trade System, supra note 111, at 298. 
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both a carbon tax and cap-and-trade, emissions reductions are 
achieved by the lowest cost reducers rather than the higher-cost re-
ducers.130 
In addition, market advocates argue that market-based mecha-
nisms generate technology innovation incentives.131 Having a price 
on carbon would create an incentive to avoid carbon emissions by 
prompting entities to switch to lower-carbon alternatives and de-
velop new, lower-polluting technologies. If allowances are distrib-
uted for free, then entities will look for new ways to reduce emis-
sions so that they can generate extra allowances to sell. If allowances 
are sold by auction or there is a carbon tax, then entities will have 
an incentive to find new ways to reduce emissions to reduce the cost 
of allowance purchases or tax payments. In power markets that dis-
patch power sources based on the lowest-cost source, a carbon price 
would increase the relative cost of power from carbon-heavy 
sources and reduce the relative cost of power from low- or no-car-
bon sources, reducing demand for high-carbon sources and creating 
systemic incentives for lower-carbon power. 
The core feature of market-based mechanisms, for the purposes 
of this essay, is that they delegate considerable substantive decision-
making authority to the private sector.132 Of course, the government 
role is important: in a cap-and-trade program, the government sets 
the emissions cap, establishes the terms and conditions for allow-
ance distribution and trading, and is responsible for monitoring and 
compliance.133 Under a carbon tax, the government sets the tax rate, 
determines exceptions, collects the tax payments, and monitors 
compliance.134 In both systems, government decisions determine 
revenue allocation. 
Market-based mechanisms, however, devolve the question of 
how to reduce emissions to the private sector, to be guided by the 
                                                                                                             
 130 See id. at 298, 329. 
 131 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1349–50; Dudek & 
Palmisano, supra note 111, at 234–36; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 111, at 13. 
 132 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1342–43. 
 133 See generally TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 114 (describing the wide 
array of design parameters governments must consider in developing a cap-and-
trade program). 
 134 See generally RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 121, at 16–17 (describing 
government role in implementing a carbon tax). 
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incentives created by the carbon price.135 That devolution is valua-
ble, according to economic theory, because social welfare is best 
served by allowing individuals (or individual entities) to make deci-
sions in the market, rather than attempting to discern the public in-
terest through government institutions.136 
As a practical matter, devolving authority to the private sector 
lessens the government’s rulemaking burden.137 For some types of 
technology-based regulations, the traditional rulemaking process is 
long and resource-intensive, requiring government agencies to de-
velop expertise in pollution-control technologies for the industries 
they regulate.138 Moreover, regulations, once adopted, often face 
time- and resource-consuming legal challenges.139 Market mecha-
nisms that devolve decision-making to industry could avoid the ex-
pense and delay of government rulemaking processes and ensuing 
litigation.140 
                                                                                                             
 135 Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow state in a recent Article on environ-
mental policy and innovation that, under a traditional economics perspective, once 
a carbon tax has internalized the harm from burning fossil fuels the government 
should “let the cards lay where they fall” and let the private sector solve the prob-
lem “in the cheapest, most efficient way.” Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, 
Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 391 (2017). 
An editorial critiquing Ontario’s decision to couple a cap-and-trade program with 
additional measures stated that the province, after adopting the cap-and-trade pro-
gram, “could have left it up to millions of people and businesses to figure out . . . 
how to most efficiently reduce their individual fossil-fuel costs and consumption.” 
Mark Blinch, Editorial, Ontario Is Fighting Climate Change the Wrong Way, 
GLOBE & MAIL (June 10, 2016), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/edito-
rials/ontario-is-fighting-climate-change-the-wrong-way/article30399356/
?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&. 
 136 See Spence, Naïve Markets, supra note 59, at 999 (describing an assump-
tion among certain economists that one can only determine what serves social 
welfare by looking at individual decisions in the market). 
 137 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1342–43; Carlson, supra note 
127, at 215. 
 138 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 215 (observing that one advantage of cap-
and-trade is that “the regulating government need not identify potential control 
technologies and thus the burden of administering the system should be lower”); 
see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1336–37. 
 139 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1337. 
 140 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 215; see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra 
note 111, at 1336–37, 1342. 
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For their part, industry players welcome market mechanisms 
that let them decide how and when to reduce emissions, since they 
have the most expertise and familiarity with their own day-to-day 
technical and economic circumstances.141 Private sector flexibility 
also reduces the negative impacts of more rigid requirements and 
creates space for industry innovation.142 As a California legislator 
stated in debates over extending California’s cap-and-trade pro-
gram, cap-and-trade “is better than Soviet-style command and con-
trol. Markets are better than the government coercing people into 
doing things they don’t want to do.”143 
3. THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF 
PRESCRIPTIVE AND MARKET-BASED MEASURES 
Market advocates suggest that a carbon price should be the dom-
inant mechanism prompting emissions reductions.144 As Carlson 
notes, in a purely market-based system, “the price of allowances 
should provide the necessary signal to the utility to guide its behav-
ior. Those reductions that are cost-effective should be made; other-
wise other emitters that can make cheaper reductions should make 
                                                                                                             
 141 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1342–43. 
 142 See Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Reg-
ulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 277 (2007). Eco-
nomic theorists laud the private autonomy and flexibility offered by markets, and 
are correspondingly skeptical of more direct regulatory measures they view as 
impinging upon freedom. See Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 
984–85 (describing pro-market conservatives’ reliance on economic theory). 
 143 George Skelton, Gov. Brown’s Climate Change Deal Was a Lesson in 
Compromise That Should Be Studied in the White House, L.A. TIMES (July 20, 
2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-skelton-cap-and-trade-cli-
mate-change-california-bipartisan-vote-20170720-story.html. 
 144 See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw & Karen L. Palmer, Mixing It Up: Power Sector 
Energy and Regional and Regulatory Climate Policies in the Presence of a Car-
bon Tax, in IMPLEMENTING A U.S. CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES 191 
(Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015) (noting economists’ position); Jesse D. Jenkins, Po-
litical Economy Constraints on Carbon Pricing Policies: What Are the Implica-
tions for Economic Efficiency, Environmental Efficacy, and Climate Policy De-
sign?, 69 ENERGY POL’Y 467, 468 (2014); Stavins, U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, 
supra note 111; see also David Schoenbrod & Richard B. Stewart, The Cap-and-
Trade Bait and Switch, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2009, 12:42 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203609204574314312524495
276. 
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the reductions.”145 Of course, utilities and other energy players do 
not operate in an unbounded market; as Boyd observes, public utility 
law is designed to exert “social control over private business.”146 
State PUCs and FERC play important roles in structuring and guid-
ing the electricity system in both traditionally regulated states and 
restructured states.147 Nonetheless, in all of these contexts, state leg-
islatures and their PUCs can choose the degree to which they affirm-
atively direct utility investment decisions toward a clean energy 
transition instead of allowing power companies, utilities, and other 
energy system players to lead the way in response to market signals 
and internal business factors. 
Market advocates do not rule out some role for prescriptive plan-
ning and regulation, but see such efforts primarily as a necessary 
complement to the dominant market-based mechanism.148 Direct 
planning or regulation that attempts to direct how and where emis-
sions reductions should occur would interfere with the ideal opera-
tion of market-based mechanisms, which allow regulated entities to 
choose their preferred and least-costly compliance paths. 
First, assuming an adequate carbon price, market advocates 
would argue that direct planning or regulation would be overkill. 
Such a “belt and suspenders” approach would lead to duplicative 
signals and unnecessary administrative and industry burdens.149 In-
dustry would argue that a cap and the associated carbon price will 
                                                                                                             
 145 Carlson, supra note 127, at 229. 
 146 Boyd, supra note 2, at 1616. 
 147 Some states have retained the traditional model of vertically integrated util-
ities regulated by state PUCS, some have partially deregulated by creating a mar-
ket for generation but retaining utility control over distribution, while some states 
have entirely deregulated, creating markets for both energy generation and distri-
bution. See infra notes 216–28 and accompanying text. 
 148 See generally Carlson, supra note 127, at 209–17. In later scholarship, 
Carlson has recognized the critical role of public utilities in facilitating and shap-
ing the path toward decarbonization. See generally Boyd & Carlson, supra note 
58. 
 149 Regulations would be redundant if the carbon price drove reductions to the 
same level as regulations, or farther. This would occur if the carbon price ex-
ceeded the cost of regulatory compliance, since the entity, in response to the car-
bon price, would likely reduce by more than required by the regulation. See Arik 
Levinson, Belts and Suspenders: Interactions Among Climate Policy Regulations 
4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16109, 2010), 
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drive the necessary reductions, and any additional requirements and 
interference are burdensome and unnecessary to achieve reduction 
goals. 
Second, planning and regulation could undermine the cost-ef-
fectiveness of market-based mechanisms. As discussed above, mar-
ket-based mechanisms generate a price signal that stimulates the 
least-cost reduction opportunities, wherever they may be.150 But 
planning or regulatory measures require that certain steps be taken, 
even if those steps are not the most cost-effective.151 As a result, 
achieving the environmental goal becomes more expensive than it 
otherwise would be.152 Given the scale of necessary reductions, the 
relative cost of available mechanisms is a critical variable.153 
Policy analysts have explored the relative costs of reducing a 
given level of emissions through renewable portfolio standards 
(RPSs), which require utilities to use a certain percentage of renew-
able energy as opposed to a cap-and-trade approach. As Carlson re-
ports, an MIT study concluded that achieving a certain level of re-
ductions through cap-and-trade combined with an RPS would cost 
25% more than achieving reductions through cap-and-trade alone.154 
A 2010 California Public Utilities Commission study evidences an 
even higher cost differential: the study estimated that achieving re-
ductions to comply with the state’s then-extant 33% renewable port-
folio standard would cost more than four times the cost of allow-
                                                                                                             
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16109.pdf. It should be noted that Levinson pre-
dicts that such scenarios would be unusual because carbon prices are likely to be 
lower than regulatory costs, and so a carbon price is unlikely to force action that 
goes beyond simultaneous regulatory requirements. See id. at 5. 
 150 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 228–30. 
 152 See id. at 210–11; see also Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 144, at 206 (not-
ing the renewable portfolio standards are less cost-effective than a carbon price). 
Levinson observes that regulatory measures defeat the cost-effectiveness goals of 
a market-based policy when regulatory requirements force entities to reduce their 
carbon emissions by more than they would in response to a carbon price, assum-
ing, as is commonly the case, that the carbon price is less than the cost of regula-
tory compliance. Levinson, supra note 149, at 5–6 (describing studies showing 
the greater cost associated with non-market regulations). 
 153 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 216–17. 
 154 See id. at 235–36. 
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ances in the cap-and-trade program—$133 per metric ton as com-
pared to $30 per ton of reduced carbon.155 Although these studies 
were completed when renewable energy costs were higher than they 
are at present,156 the basic premise remains: a price signal steers in-
vestment toward the least expensive options, while prescriptive 
measures risk requiring more expensive means for achieving the 
same level of greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
In addition, if a cap-and-trade program is coupled with regula-
tory measures, the regulatory measures will induce direct reductions 
and reduce demand for allowances, lowering allowance prices.157 
Lower allowance prices could reduce the innovation incentive, that 
is, the incentive to develop new mechanisms for lowering emissions 
beyond those that are already required by regulation.158 Analysts of 
low carbon allowance prices in California’s cap-and-trade program 
observe that direct measures have driven most of the reductions, 
thereby lowering the demand for, and the price of, carbon allow-
ances.159 
Even market advocates recognize, however, that planning or 
regulation may be necessary under certain circumstances. Because 
effective enforcement of market measures requires highly effective 
emissions monitoring, prescriptive measures may be more appropri-
ate to control fugitive emissions and other difficult-to-measure 
                                                                                                             
 155 Id. at 238. 
 156 See, e.g., Robert Fares, The Price of Solar Is Declining to Unprecedented 
Lows, SCI. AM.: PLUGGED IN (Aug. 27, 2016), https://blogs.scientificameri-
can.com/plugged-in/the-price-of-solar-is-declining-to-unprecedented-lows/. 
 157 Carlson, supra note 127, at 236. 
 158 See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 144, at 204; Carlson, supra note 127, at 
236, 240. Carlson notes that the net impact of prescriptive measures is uncertain: 
although prescriptive regulations would reduce allowance prices, the prescriptive 
measures could create their own innovation incentives. See id. at 240. See also 
infra notes 431–42 and accompanying text (discussing innovation incentives cre-
ated by prescriptive measures). 
 159 See Chris Busch, Carbon Prices Rise in California’s Cap-and-Trade Pro-
gram as Legal Certainty Grows, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/02/08/carbon-prices-rise-in-cali-
fornias-cap-and-trade-program-as-legal-certainty-grows/#782babc62355 [herein-
after Busch, Carbon Prices Rise] (describing how California’s multiple climate 
policies, along with the 2008–09 recession, reduced demand for allowances and 
allowance prices). 
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emission sources.160 In addition, regulation may be necessary when 
market failures prevent the price signal from inducing the desired 
response.161 For example, where tenants pay for utilities, landlords 
have little incentive to install efficient appliances or increase energy 
efficiency.162 Tenants, in turn, do not control the initial investments 
that determine their unit’s efficiency.163 The same “split incentives” 
occur between developers and subsequent building owners.164 
Moreover, building occupants are often unaware of their specific 
energy use or mechanisms to reduce consumption,165 or may lack 
the ability to finance efficiency measures.166 To overcome these 
market failures, measures that require or incentivize landlords and 
building developers to increase energy efficiency could, therefore, 
be justified.167 But any such measures would be “complementary” 
to the primary market mechanism—useful additions rather than co-
equal measures.168 
In sum, from an economics’ perspective, market mechanisms are 
the best way to internalize externalities, achieve goals cost-effec-
tively, incentivize innovation, and give industries the flexibility and 
autonomy to use their in-depth knowledge to advance public goals. 
Coupling a market mechanism with additional prescriptive 
measures would dampen or sacrifice all of these benefits. Under this 
                                                                                                             
 160 See Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 22); see also Byron Swift, U.S. 
Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and Opportunities, 20 NAT’L RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 3, 3 (2005). 
 161 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 216; R. Denniss et al., Complementary Cli-
mate Change Policies: A Framework for Evaluation, 23 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 
33, 39 (2012); Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 22); Benjamin Görlach, 
Emissions Trading in the Climate Policy Mix – Understanding and Managing In-
teractions with Other Policy Instruments, 25 ENERGY & ENV’T 733, 745 (2014). 
In Australia, a government organization specified that “complementary 
measures” to the planned market mechanism should target and be tightly linked 
to market failures. See Denniss et al., supra note 161, at 35; see generally Burtraw 
& Palmer, supra note 144, at 204 (discussing debate over the degree to which 
market failures reduce the effectiveness of a carbon price on consumer effi-
ciency). 
 162 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 244. 
 163 See id. at 244. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See id. at 245. 
 167 See id. at 247–48. 
 168 See id. at 210. 
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view, complementary planning and regulation should be embraced 
only when monitoring concerns impede the proper functioning of a 
market-based mechanism or to compensate for some sort of market 
failure. 
B. Prescriptive Measures to Reduce Electricity-Sector Emissions 
To analyze governance opportunities in the electricity sector, I 
first lay the groundwork by providing an overview of electricity-
sector governance, and then introduce a wide range of governance 
strategies for reducing carbon emissions. 
1. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
As Welton has observed, “the United States has a byzantine bu-
reaucratic structure for governing electric energy,” with a complex 
mix of federal, regional, state, and local oversight over various di-
mensions of energy generation, supply, and demand.169 In simplistic 
terms, the federal government has power over wholesale electricity 
sales and interstate transmission,170 while the states retain primary 
authority to choose sources of electricity and regulate infrastructure 
siting and retail distribution.171 The more complex reality will be 
elaborated below as relevant. 
Respective governance roles have emerged from a long history 
of federal and state energy initiatives. For most of the twentieth cen-
tury, utilities were vertically integrated monopolies, with utilities 
owning and operating generation (traditionally large fossil-fuel 
                                                                                                             
 169 Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 16). Some scholars recognize the 
benefits of having a diverse range of actors at multiple governance levels. See 
generally, e.g., Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58. 
 170 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
 171 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (retaining state authority over retail sales). Alt-
hough I have delineated “federal” and “state” roles quite crisply in this Article, 
the relationship between federal and state prerogatives is, in fact, often blurred. 
For example, the Supreme Court has held that state programs incentivizing re-
newable energy are preempted by the Federal Power Act because the additional 
energy would drive down wholesale prices in RTO auctions, thus infringing upon 
FERC’s authority over wholesale power markets. See Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016); see generally Jim Rossi, The Brave 
New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399 (2016); Amy L. Stein, Pit-
falls Along the Brave New Energy Federalism Path, 95 TEX. L. REV. 114 (2017). 
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power plants), transmission, and the distribution system to individ-
ual customers.172 State PUCs closely regulated their monopoly util-
ities, and the federal government’s role was largely limited to its 
power to set wholesale prices for electricity in interstate com-
merce.173 
As Boyd describes, the pervasive deregulatory impulses of the 
1970s and 1980s led to partial electricity deregulation in the 
1990s.174 To spur competition among electricity generators, the 
1992 Energy Policy Act encouraged states to require their utilities 
to sell off their generating facilities and purchase power through 
wholesale electricity markets.175 The Energy Policy Act further sup-
ported generator competition by requiring open access to interstate 
transmission lines.176 In states that chose to deregulate, the whole-
sale power markets are run by Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs).177 RTOs and 
ISOs play an intermediary role, facilitating the interactions between 
generators, transmission line owners, and utilities and other custom-
ers within their jurisdictions.178 The RTOs and ISOs are regulated 
by FERC.179 
The deregulation effort addressed not only energy supply, but 
distribution as well. Although state utilities retained control over the 
actual distribution lines, states could authorize multiple Retail Elec-
tricity Providers (REPs), giving consumers the choice of obtaining 
                                                                                                             
 172 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 836. 
 173 See id. at 822–24. 
 174 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1651–56 (describing neoliberal critique of reg-
ulation and preference for markets); id. at 1661–63 (describing electricity dereg-
ulation). 
 175 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 831 & n.79 (tracing deregulation to 
the 1992 Energy Policy Act, which gave states the option of partially or fully 
deregulating their utilities and participating in FERC-regulated wholesale power 
markets). 
 176 See id. The expectation was that competition among generators in whole-
sale power markets would provide “just and reasonable” prices, rather than rely-
ing on PUCs or FERC to set the rates. See id. 
 177 KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 77–78. 
 178 See id. at 75–77. 
 179 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1663. 
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power from the incumbent utility or a new provider.180 The REPs 
are regulated by state PUCs.181 
The Energy Policy Act allowed, but did not require, states to de-
regulate.182 Some states embraced the full deregulatory restructuring 
enabled by the Energy Policy Act, restructuring their electricity sys-
tems at both the wholesale and retail levels.183 Other states have var-
ious types of hybrid structures, structures which usually retain utility 
control over retail sales and participation in RTO-run wholesale 
markets but vary in the degree to which they have required utilities 
to divest their generation assets.184 And many other states, primarily 
located in the Mountain West and Southeast, have chosen not to de-
regulate and have retained the traditional regulated monopoly struc-
ture, with vertically integrated generation, transmission, and retail 
distribution.185 
Shifts in the electricity sector and deregulation have had feder-
alism impacts. Federal regulation of the RTOs and ISOs, and the 
associated increase in wholesale electricity sales subject to federal 
jurisdiction, has given the federal government a greater role than it 
has had historically.186 In addition, recent Supreme Court case law 
on the degree to which state energy policies can impact wholesale 
power markets has created considerable uncertainty about the 
boundaries of permissible state action.187 Notwithstanding uncer-
tainty, however, the states continue to exercise jurisdiction over gen-
eration and many other features of the electricity sector,188 and con-
tinue to have an important role to play in directing decarbonization 
pathways. 
                                                                                                             
 180 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 837. Most residential consumers 
have, however, retained the incumbent utility as their default service provider. Id. 
at 833. 
 181 See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 837. 
 182 See id. at 834. 
 183 See id. at 831–33. 
 184 See id. at 838. 
 185 See id. at 836 & n.95. 
 186 See id. at 824–25. 
 187 See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016) 
(holding that Maryland’s guarantee of a certain price to generators who built ca-
pacity in a needed location was preempted by the Federal Power Act’s authority 
over wholesale prices). 
 188 Id. at 1298. 
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2. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS FOR PROMPTING AND              
SHAPING DECARBONIZATION 
Prescriptive measures to reduce electricity-sector carbon emis-
sions must account for the underlying complexity of electricity-sec-
tor governance. In addition to overarching planning, government 
measures can address generation, transmission, distribution, and de-
mand reduction, singly or in combination. I note numerous exam-
ples but do not contend that they provide a roadmap or that existing 
structures and initiatives are sufficient. In some cases, existing gov-
ernance mechanisms may require significant reform to achieve deep 
decarbonization. 
The analysis reveals that governance initiatives will be im-
portant with or without market mechanisms. Because of the com-
plexity of the underlying grid and the interweaving of private and 
public control to serve public ends, even a largely market-based pro-
gram for carbon reduction must grapple with underlying electricity-
sector governance parameters.189 The description demonstrates the 
backdrop in which a carbon price might fall and lays the groundwork 
for understanding the kinds of governance initiatives that may be 
necessary to achieve a clean energy transition. 
a. Federal and State Roles 
Given the complexity and variety of institutions shaping the 
electricity sector, the wide variety of potential governance mecha-
nisms is not surprising. And the question of the appropriate roles for 
federal, regional, and state governance is fraught and much de-
bated.190 In this Article, I simply outline existing governmental in-
stitutions and the roles they have been playing, without opining on 
                                                                                                             
 189 See TOMAIN, supra note 107, at 157–90 (describing the need for regulatory 
innovation to manage a clean energy transition). 
 190 See, e.g., Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 881–92 (describing federalism 
implications of state and federal agency energy decisions); Lincoln L. Davies, 
Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 
(2010) (describing this debate as “an ‘ossified’ stalemate, a ‘long congressional 
deep freeze’” (citation omitted)); see generally Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013); Rossi, supra 
note 190; see also Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Stand-
ard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427–29 (2010). 
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or otherwise analyzing the important federalism dimensions that 
questions of “governance” inevitably raise. 
At the federal level, the EPA has authority to address power 
plant carbon emissions under the Clean Air Act.191 As noted above, 
the Obama Administration had promulgated the Clean Power Plan, 
a far-reaching effort to encourage states to integrate their environ-
mental and energy decision-making to achieve significant reduc-
tions.192 However, these efforts have stalled under the Trump Ad-
ministration.193 
Other federal initiatives remain important. Congress has author-
ized tax credits for wind and solar energy that have been significant 
drivers of renewable energy development.194 In addition, the Depart-
ment of Energy has supported research on renewables, efficiency, 
clean coal, and other options.195 Moreover, the federal government 
has provided funding for expensive and innovative pilot projects, 
including carbon capture and storage.196 As discussed further below, 
FERC regulation of wholesale electricity sales and its oversight over 
RTOs and ISOs provide additional levers for promoting decarboni-
zation.197 
Notwithstanding these significant federal levers, much of the au-
thority to shape a low-carbon future remains with the states.198 Key 
                                                                                                             
 191 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the federal Clean 
Power Plan, which was promulgated under the federal Clean Air Act). Id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See Grandoni, supra note 37; see also Cusick, supra note 37. 
 194 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 140–48 (describing wide array 
of federal tax credits for energy development); RANDOLPH & MASTER, supra note 
64, at 692–96 (same). 
 195 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 6. 
 196 See id. (describing federal funding for research and development); 
RANDOLPH & MASTERS, supra note 64, at 696–99 (describing federal research 
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 197 See infra Section II.B.2.a. 
 198 That authority is not unbounded; some state initiatives may be preempted 
by the Federal Power Act. See supra note 190 (discussing preemption of state 
renewables incentives). State actions are also limited by the Dormant Commerce 
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Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. 
J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 59, 85, 90–98 (2012); David R. Hodas, State Law Re-
sponses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Lo-
cally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 67–72 (2003); see generally Alexandra B. 
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players include state legislatures, public utility and energy commis-
sions, as well as environmental agencies.199 State legislatures have 
varied in their degree of engagement, with many leaving most of the 
hard decisions to state agencies,200 and others providing more sub-
stantial guidance. Even without significant legislative direction, 
PUC’s broad delegations of power often give them the discretion to 
play a key role in shaping a state’s energy path.201 In addition, be-
cause addressing electricity-sector pollution requires not only con-
trolling pollution at the end of the pipe, but also influencing energy 
supply decisions at the front end, environmental regulators and en-
ergy regulators will need to increasingly coordinate their initia-
tives.202 
The path to decarbonization will require extensive planning as 
well as measures to address generation, transmission, distribution, 
and demand reduction. Whether in restructured or traditional states, 
numerous governmental measures are underway and could continue 
to play a critical role in decarbonization.203 
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 200 See Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 13–14) (“[R]arely do politicians 
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 201 Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 48). 
 202 See Energy Activities, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.gov/en-
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ronmental Law, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2017); Alexandra B. Klass, Cli-
mate Change and the Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013). 
 203 See generally MACBETH ET AL., supra note 66 (describing numerous state 
initiatives to facilitate a clean energy transition). 
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b. Climate Action Planning 
As Boyd notes, “planning has long been at the heart of tradi-
tional utility regulation and is a major focus of the RTOs and 
ISOs.”204 This planning and more will be essential to achieving de-
carbonization.205 Planning includes generating a vision of the ulti-
mate goals and an implementation pathway.206 Whether direct gov-
ernment planning or government requirements for utility or RTO 
planning, planning will be necessary to integrate the many interre-
lated components essential to successful climate action, including 
generation, transmission, and demand reduction. 
Government entities have the institutional capacity to develop 
an overarching vision and engage in comprehensive and long-term 
planning to achieve that vision. States actively addressing climate 
change have developed climate action plans that attempt to scope 
out, in more or less detail,  their states’ respective pathways to a 
greener economy.207 Notable examples include California, de-
scribed below,208 New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision initia-
tive, embodied in a comprehensive State Energy Plan,209 and Mas-
sachusetts’ Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020.210 Given the 
                                                                                                             
 204 Boyd, supra note 2, at 1693. Boyd notes further that planning “will be a 
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Id. at 1698. 
 205 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 72. 
 206 See Dernbach, supra note 1, at 10788 (suggesting that policies should focus 
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 208 See infra Section IV.C. 
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ENERGY PLAN, https://energyplan.ny.gov/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
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ENERGY AND CLIMATE PLAN FOR 2020, 2015 UPDATE (Dec. 31, 2015), 
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increasing regionalization of the grid, many states are not only en-
gaging in state-centered planning, but coordinating their planning 
with other states in the same electricity grid.211 Similarly, although 
the Clean Power Plan has been stayed, the state implementation 
plans the rule had required represent at least a modest version of the 
necessary forward-thinking assessment of electricity-sector emis-
sions.212 
States have also required some degree of private sector planning. 
Traditional vertically-integrated states require their utilities to en-
gage in “integrated resource planning” (IRP) to assess available gen-
eration options, identify transmission needs, integrate the role of de-
mand-reduction measures like energy efficiency, and integrate en-
vironmental requirements, including the need to meet RPSs, with 
planning horizons ranging from ten to twenty years.213 As of 2014, 
twenty-eight states required utilities to file IRPs.214 In restructured 
states, where utilities purchase rather than generate power, some 
states require utilities to engage in “long-term procurement plan-
ning” to identify future needs and determine how to meet regulatory 
requirements, generally with a ten-year planning horizon.215 
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 214 See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 213, at 5 fig.2. 
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Planning can provide the overall vision and direction for gov-
ernment actions. Prescriptive measures to reduce generation, de-
velop necessary transmission, and reduce consumer demand can 
then take many different forms, as described below. 
c. Governance Mechanisms to Promote Low-Carbon Generation 
Shifting generation away from carbon will require envisioning 
and committing to a low-carbon energy supply and mechanisms to 
finance and promote investment in alternatives.216 Government ac-
tors, including FERC, state legislatures, and state PUCs, all play key 
roles in facilitating a transition to new sources of electricity. 
The specific pathways to achieve a transition vary depending 
upon the structure of the states’ electricity systems. In traditional, 
vertically integrated states, state PUCs play a critical role in deter-
mining generation investments.217 The states review utility genera-
tion investments and allow new sources only where there is a certif-
icate of need or its equivalent.218 In traditional states, utilities’ Inte-
grated Resource Plans provide a template for future generation 
needs.219 
In both restructured and traditional states, state RPSs that require 
utilities to use or purchase a certain percentage of renewable power 
are a primary state legislative mechanism to express a state’s renew-
ables goals and steer a transition to clean energy.220 Over half the 
states have RPSs.221 They vary significantly in ambition, with some 
requiring only a small percentage of renewables and others, like Cal-
ifornia, requiring up to 50% renewables.222 The generation sources 
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considered “renewable” also vary considerably, as does the degree 
to which the state controls choices among available renewable op-
tions.223 
In addition to RPSs, states could also initiate direct measures to 
address high-carbon sources, measures that could be designed to re-
duce both carbon and co-pollutant emissions. In 2006, California 
established an electricity performance standard that rules out new 
in-state coal plants or new contracts for importing coal.224 Oregon 
has prohibited the use of coal-fired power after 2035,225 and the state 
of Washington negotiated the closure of the state’s only coal-fired 
power plant by 2025.226 Recognizing the environmental harms 
caused by coal-fired power, Colorado’s Clean Air Clean Jobs Act of 
2010 set demanding criteria pollutant reduction requirements that 
led to coal-plant retirements and shifts from coal to natural gas, a 
shift that has also reduced carbon.227 To address the reliability con-
cerns associated with intermittent renewables, which depend upon 
uncertain and episodic sun and wind conditions, some states have 
begun to require utilities to invest in energy storage.228 
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Although local citizens and governments have not historically 
played a strong role in controlling electricity generation, local gov-
ernments and, in some cases, local citizens are playing an increasing 
role. For example, in some hybrid states, where regulated utilities 
are responsible for distribution, citizens are voting to opt out of the 
utility’s supply and obtain their energy from “community choice ag-
gregators,” which often (although not necessarily) supply a higher 
percentage of renewable energy than the local utility.229 In these 
cases, through local government action, citizens are directly exer-
cising their preference for renewable energy. 
No matter how vaunted the goals and precise the planning, tran-
sitioning to new generation sources requires financing. According 
to one expert, financing can be difficult for capital-intensive invest-
ments, including low- and no-carbon assets.230 In both traditional 
and restructured states, government agencies play a critical role in 
creating conditions that could either facilitate or frustrate financing. 
In traditional jurisdictions, states and their PUCs set the rules 
determining how and when utilities recover the costs of their gener-
ation investments.231 These rules determine whether utilities will 
have sufficient certainty about their cost recovery to obtain financ-
ing.232 Several traditional states have revised their cost-recovery 
rules to enable their utilities’ investment in expensive nuclear power 
and carbon-capture-and-storage projects.233 Although the wisdom of 
these investments has been deeply controversial,234 they demon-
strate the key role PUCs play in determining the viability of gener-
ation investments. 
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In restructured states, the utilities no longer control generation 
and the state no longer controls cost recovery for generation invest-
ments.235 However, the wholesale markets run by the RTOs and 
ISOs are structured by FERC, and the pricing structure significantly 
affects the ease or difficulty of assuring generators that they will be 
able to recover their costs through sales in the wholesale power mar-
kets.236 FERC’s authority over RTO and ISO’s wholesale pricing 
structure could prove to be a critical lever for encouraging invest-
ment in new renewable generation, investment that may be ham-
pered by the current pricing mechanism.237 
In addition to utility-scale renewables, distributed generation at 
the consumer level could play an important role in decarbonizing 
the grid. Distributed generation, particularly distributed solar power, 
has surged in recent years due to decreasing costs, attractive federal 
tax credits, and new financing mechanisms that have reduced the 
barriers to investing in residential solar power.238 At the state level, 
“net metering,” which requires utilities to pay households and other 
distributed generators the retail price for power they add to the grid, 
has been a critical governmental mechanism for promoting distrib-
uted generation.239 As of 2016, forty-four states and the District of 
Columbia have established net metering programs.240 States and lo-
cal governments have also actively facilitated distributed generation 
by developing programs to help finance solar panels241 and other 
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ment to shift pricing mechanisms in order to facilitate investment in renewables). 
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measures to promote distributed generation.242 And, as distributed 
generation increases and utility sales decrease, numerous states are 
struggling to determine appropriate measures for ensuring a reliable 
grid and distributing its costs fairly.243 
d. Governance Mechanisms to Promote the Transmission and 
Distribution of Low-Carbon Electricity 
Government measures can also play a critical role in facilitating 
the transmission grid necessary to access and accommodate availa-
ble renewable resources. State PUCs are primarily responsible for 
siting both intrastate and interstate transmission lines.244 In tradi-
tional states, PUCs can require utilities to plan for and develop the 
transmission necessary for renewable resources.245 In Texas, a re-
structured state, the legislature tasked the state’s PUC to oversee the 
development of transmission lines to enable renewables develop-
ment, enabling Texas wind power to surge.246 More broadly, FERC 
has required all transmission providers to participate in regional 
transmission planning, including planning for the development of 
renewables currently lacking transmission.247 For example, the Mid-
continent Independent System Operator (MISO), which operates the 
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electricity transmission system for ten Midwestern states, has been 
working with state regulators and planners to develop transmission 
that would bring wind energy from the western MISO member states 
to the higher-population eastern MISO states.248 
Government could also play an essential role in ensuring that the 
distribution system—the grid connecting consumers and electricity 
suppliers—facilitates decarbonization. The distribution system is 
critical to integrating distributed generation. Because distributed 
generation could be perceived as a threat to the utilities’ business,249 
government action requiring utilities to allow and plan for distrib-
uted generation may be needed to overcome any resistance. For ex-
ample, California requires its major utilities to plan for and incorpo-
rate distributed resources in their planning exercises.250 
Numerous states have passed legislation or promulgated plans 
and requirements that facilitate the development of a smart grid to 
enhance renewable integration and enable demand-response mech-
anisms for enhancing efficiency.251 In addition to pushing utilities 
to integrate distributed renewable resources, PUCs can work with 
utilities to adapt the grid to manage “bidirectional power flows,” that 
is, flows both to and from consumers.252 Numerous states, through 
legislative or PUC action, have developed strategies for requiring 
and helping utilities modernize the grid.253 
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e. Governance Mechanisms to Reduce Consumer Demand 
Investing in a “smart grid” would not only facilitate the integra-
tion of distributed generation and distributed storage, but would also 
allow utilities to use price signals to reduce consumer demand for 
energy. At the federal level, FERC has exercised its authority over 
RTOs and ISOs to require them to accept bids and provide payment 
for not only electricity supply but promises to reduce demand.254 At 
the state level, through their control of utility retail pricing, PUCs 
can encourage or require utilities to adjust prices to reduce consumer 
demand when doing so would optimize the use of grid resources.255 
In addition to enabling price-based incentives, a “smart grid” distri-
bution system could enable energy suppliers to remotely adjust ther-
mostats to reduce demand during peak times.256 
Government measures can reduce consumer demand through 
numerous other mechanisms. They can require their utilities to fa-
cilitate consumer efficiency through energy efficiency resource 
standards (EERSs), which require utilities to achieve a percentage 
reduction in electricity sales by facilitating consumer energy effi-
ciency improvements, and other measures that facilitate consumer 
                                                                                                             
 254 The FERC Order allowing demand-response bids, Order No. 719, was up-
held by the Supreme Court in Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply 
Assoc., 136 S. Ct. 760, 771 (2016). 
 255 Utilities and system operators must ensure sufficient capacity to provide 
energy during times of peak demand, which could require the use of high-carbon 
sources or, in many cases, prompts investment in fossil-fuel peaker plants de-
signed to generate power only at times of peak demand. Incentives to reduce 
power use during peak times could reduce investment in and operation of fossil 
fuel sources serving peak demand. See, e.g., Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 
870–77 (describing time-variant pricing and initial implementation efforts). 
 256 See generally Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the 
Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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efficiency.257 More than half the states have adopted such 
measures.258 
Government measures can directly improve efficiency through 
green building standards, like insulation and tight window require-
ments.259 Federal and state appliance efficiency standards can also 
play an important role—though, as federal appliance efficiency ini-
tiatives have increased, state efforts increasingly face the risk of 
preemption.260 In addition to standards, requiring building develop-
ers and appliance manufacturers to provide energy efficiency infor-
mation supports informed consumer choice. Rebates, loans, and tax 
credits for energy-efficient appliances or buildings could spur con-
sumer efficiency investments.261 
C. Markets versus Governance: From Dichotomy to Continuum 
It is important to recognize that a strict dichotomy between mar-
ket-based and prescriptive measures oversimplifies the reality of 
these policy mechanisms. Market-based mechanisms are the prod-
uct of government decisions and frequently operate within a govern-
ance-structured environment, while many prescriptive measures 
                                                                                                             
 257 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 219; MACBETH ET AL., supra 
note 66, at 15–16, 18–19, 21, 27, 30, 32, 34 (describing Maryland’s 2008 legisla-
tion that required utilities to achieve significant improvements in energy effi-
ciency; Massachusetts’s energy-efficiency initiatives; Minnesota’s energy-effi-
ciency program requirements; New Hampshire’s initiatives, including but not lim-
ited to an EERS; Oregon’s investments in energy-efficiency programs; Pennsyl-
vania’s energy-efficiency programs; and Rhode Island’s programs). 
 258 DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS (AND GOALS) 
(Oct. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/Energy-Efficiency-Resource-Standards.pdf (displaying twenty states 
with mandatory requirements and eight states with EERS goals). 
 259 See, e.g., MACBETH ET AL., supra note 66, at 25 (describing Nevada’s green 
building standards). 
 260 States have the authority to develop appliance efficiency standards unless 
and until the federal government develops standards for the same appliances. See 
generally Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revis-
ited: Federalism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335 (2010). 
 261 See MACBETH ET AL., supra note 66, at 11–12, 18–19 (describing Dela-
ware’s financial assistance for home efficiency improvements and Massachu-
setts’s use of greenhouse gas auction revenue to support energy efficiency ef-
forts). 
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provide substantial flexibility to regulated entities and include mar-
ket features like trading. 
In a cap-and-trade program, for example, setting the emissions 
target and yearly caps are essential and controversial governance de-
cisions. Many features of program operation require careful govern-
mental deliberation. Government institutions must determine the ap-
propriate scale (local, state, regional, international) as well as the 
program’s scope (what economic sectors to include). They must de-
cide whether to distribute allowances for free or to sell them by auc-
tion (and to whom, and through what mechanism, and with what 
terms and conditions on purchases, prices, and transactions). Cap-
and-trade program designers also decide whether to allow carbon 
offsets and, if so, what kind, from where, and what standards and 
procedures to establish for measuring their validity. Carbon taxes 
are simpler in operation, but the level of the tax becomes the all-
important question, as does the scope of its applicability and the de-
gree and basis for any exceptions. Moreover, determining how to 
distribute revenue from cap-and-trade and tax programs presents 
central governance questions and opportunities for deliberation. 
Market-based mechanisms do not operate in isolation; they op-
erate within the context of existing electricity regulatory structures. 
Thus, a carbon price not only creates an amorphous incentive to re-
duce carbon, it can impact the functioning of regulated electricity 
markets. For example, a carbon price increases the relative operating 
cost of high-carbon fuel and makes it less likely to be dispatched 
than a lower-carbon fuel. In addition, as utilities and transmission 
organizations engage in their PUC- or FERC-required planning ex-
ercises, carbon prices reduce the desirability of higher-carbon re-
sources by increasing their cost relative to lower-carbon re-
sources.262 Moreover, the highly structured nature of electricity mar-
kets means that government will have a role to play even if policy-
makers choose to rely on a price signal to generate carbon reduc-
tions. Looking forward, as generation sources shift from centralized 
                                                                                                             
 262 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 229; see also Boyd, supra note 2, at 1695–
96 (noting the impact of “carbon adders” on electricity planning). 
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fossil fuel generation to increasing levels of renewables and distrib-
uted generation, existing electricity market rules will require gov-
ernment-led revision.263 
For their part, prescriptive regulations vary considerably in the 
degree to which they dictate behavior or allow flexibility. Most cli-
mate governance does not rely on the kind of “command and con-
trol” technology standards that market proponents envision as the 
regulatory alternative to market-based approaches.264 For example, 
state RPSs do not dictate particular technologies; they set a percent-
age goal and identify a range of renewables that could meet the 
standard.265 States vary in the types of options available and the de-
gree to which they direct their utilities to choose certain options, but 
all leave some choice to market players. Moreover, many RPSs have 
explicit trading features: most states allow their utilities to fulfill at 
least some portion of the RPS obligation with “renewable energy 
credits.”266 
Tax incentives for particular types of energy also share both pre-
scriptive and market features. By providing tax credits only to cer-
tain forms of energy, tax credits have a strongly prescriptive charac-
ter: they represent a value judgment to reward a particular type of 
energy production. However, they do not require a specific level of 
production, and instead rely on market forces to respond to the in-
centive. Net metering, which allows distributed generators to re-
ceive payment for their contributions to the grid, is prescriptive in 
the sense that it is offered to encourage a particular form of energy, 
but relies on the “market” of consumers to respond to the incen-
tive.267 
Nevertheless, as we contemplate the decarbonization challenge, 
we face fundamental questions about the role of government and the 
role of private actors in charting a course toward decarbonization. 
                                                                                                             
 263 For example, as discussed above, if prices on wholesale markets are deter-
mined by relative operating costs and renewables have zero operating costs, then 
high renewables penetration could undermine generators’ ability to obtain a return 
on their investments. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
 264 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1335–39 (noting draw-
backs to technology-based “command and control” regulations). 
 265 See Carlson, supra note 127, at 231. 
 266 See id. at 231–32; Mormann, supra note 211, at 1631 (noting that RPSs 
create a market for renewable energy credits). 
 267 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 153–54. 
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The choice is not either/or, but the conceptual starting point matters 
and affects the way strategies unfold. Although governments estab-
lish the parameters for market operation, market advocates nonethe-
less seek to leave the choices about the specific mechanisms for re-
ducing carbon to private actors in the marketplace, with prescriptive 
measures included to complement the central market mechanism as 
necessary. In contrast, governance advocates suggest the need for a 
vital government role in conceptualizing, planning, and implement-
ing a transition to clean electricity, with markets supporting rather 
than leading the effort. 
III. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF PRESCRIPTIVE GOVERNANCE 
Even the most diehard market advocate would be hard-pressed 
to deny some role for governance. At a minimum, decarbonization 
will require adjustments in government rules controlling underlying 
electricity markets. Government institutions provide necessary fora 
for coordinating all forms of infrastructure investments. And some 
market advocates might even advocate for post-market social wel-
fare measures that respond to potential disruptions caused by a car-
bon price signal, like measures to address the loss of regional em-
ployment in coal states or higher electricity costs for low-income 
residents. 
But I argue for a greater role for governance: that states should 
facilitate planning and establish direct guidance in furtherance of 
those plans. Market measures focused on autonomy and efficiency 
miss the fundamental political and value issues at stake—missing 
these issues constitutes, in Spence’s words, economics’ “blind 
spot.”268 A government-led agenda could well include market com-
ponents and would likely rely on revenue from market mechanisms. 
But the question is the degree to which public institutions deliberate 
over a larger vision for a clean energy transition and play a signifi-
cant role in guiding that transition. 
Although market advocates treat the privatization of decision-
making as one of the market’s central virtues, that approach could 
shortchange collective deliberation on critical questions about our 
                                                                                                             
 268 See Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 978, 995, 1001–06. 
528 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:476 
 
future path.269 Transitioning to a clean energy economy will have 
profound environmental, socioeconomic, and political impacts.270 
As governments and private actors choose among energy options—
among coal, natural gas, nuclear, biofuels, solar, wind, geothermal, 
hydropower, and increasing energy efficiency—those decisions will 
determine how quickly and effectively we transition away from fos-
sil fuels and will impact associated co-pollutant emissions, the cost 
of energy, regional employment, and the structure of the energy in-
dustry overall. Moreover, the electricity sector is so complex—tech-
nically, economically, and administratively—that planning, coordi-
nation, and thoughtful governance initiatives at multiple levels will 
be essential to achieve the energy transition ahead. From a demo-
cratic governance perspective, government deliberation provides 
opportunities for public engagement and creates some measure of 
democratic accountability. And efforts to establish a longer-term 
and more compelling vision of a clean energy future could garner 
political support that has been slow in coming for price-based mech-
anisms. 
A. The Benefits of Multifaceted and Multi-Factor Decision-
Making 
Decarbonization will have extensive environmental, economic, 
and social consequences. Transitioning to a clean energy economy 
will cause both disruptions and opportunities to the environment, 
workers, and communities. Under a market-centered approach, gov-
ernment programs could attempt to address some of these issues af-
ter the fact: the market could do what it does, and then social welfare 
programs could address the consequences. However, a more inte-
grated approach up front—with a market mechanism as part of        
rather than the core of the approach—could more effectively antici-
pate and address the multitude of issues at stake in clean electrifica-
tion. 
                                                                                                             
 269 See TOMAIN, supra note 107, at 72–74 (summarizing argument that mar-
kets alone will not achieve a clean energy future and stressing the importance of 
governance). 
 270 See supra Section I.B. 
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When considering future pathways, government institutions 
have the capacity to maximize the benefits associated with the tran-
sition to a clean economy.271 Under a more governance-driven plan-
ning approach, government institutions can select transition path-
ways that serve multiple objectives.272 The emerging “climate jus-
tice” movement advocates for deliberate climate strategies that re-
duce pollution and bring new opportunities to disadvantaged com-
munities.273 
So, for example, in traditionally regulated states, a state com-
mission could work with utilities to retire coal-fired power plants 
located in the most populated areas or otherwise causing the worst 
air pollution while simultaneously achieving greenhouse gas and co-
pollutant benefits.274 In restructured states, environmental agencies 
could develop multi-pollutant control strategies to reduce both 
                                                                                                             
 271 See Roberts, supra note 75. 
 272 See generally JONES, supra note 98. 
 273 See id.; see generally SOVACOOL ET AL., supra note 75; Behles, supra note 
101; Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 
30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 57–74 (2012) [hereinafter Kaswan, Industrial 
Pollution] (explaining the value of comprehensive climate polices that integrate 
multiple environmental and socioeconomic factors); Uma Outka, Fairness in the 
Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 791, 
814–16 (2017) [hereinafter Outka, Fairness] (describing environmental justice 
community comments on the CPP that emphasized the need to reduce co-pollu-
tants in and spread the benefits of clean energy to disadvantaged communities and 
to spread the benefits of clean); Uma Outka, Environmental Justice Issues in Sus-
tainable Development: Environmental Justice in the Renewable Energy Transi-
tion, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60 (2012); Environmental Justice Lead-
ership Forum on Climate Change, EJNET.ORG, http://ejnet.org/ej/ejlf.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Forum on Climate Change]. 
 274 See Kaswan, Industrial Pollution, supra note 273, at 65, 76–77 (noting the 
high greenhouse gas and co-pollutant benefits of shifting away from coal-fired 
power and that choosing to control greenhouse gases where they provide the 
greatest co-pollutant benefits could contribute to the policy’s net benefits). Wash-
ington state recently reached an agreement with its utility to close the state’s last 
coal-fired power plant, simultaneously improving climate and co-pollutant out-
comes. See Mike Lindblom & Craig Welch, Agreement Reached to Stop Burning 
Coal at Centralia Power Plant, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 5, 2011, 9:44 PM), 
http:/www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/agreement-reached-to-stop-burning-
coal-at-centralia-power-plant/. 
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greenhouse gas and co-pollutants from the state’s most harmful gen-
erators.275  
In contrast, a carbon price, by definition, prices only carbon and 
cannot include other associated variables in its signaling. And, from 
a distributional perspective, market-based mechanisms do not pro-
vide a direct mechanism for channeling greenhouse gas reductions 
to maximize their co-pollutant benefits.276 Although other laws 
more directly address co-pollutants and have achieved significant 
progress, in some areas they have failed to achieve air quality stand-
ards,277 and a more integrated approach to achieving both green-
house gas and co-pollutant reductions could prove more success-
ful.278 
As advocated by the climate justice movement, state decision-
makers can choose options that create new opportunities for com-
munities, particularly communities in need.279 Energy-efficiency 
and distributed-renewables policies not only reduce carbon but may 
                                                                                                             
 275 See, e.g., BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., SPARE THE AIR, COOL 
THE CLIMATE: A BLUEPRINT FOR CLEAN AIR AND CLIMATE PROTECTION IN THE 
BAY AREA 5/3–5/29 (2017), http://www.baaqmd.gov/~/media/files/planning-
and-research/plans/2017-clean-air-plan/attachment-a_-proposed-final-cap-vol-1-
pdf.pdf?la=en. 
 276 See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change 
Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10302 (2008) [hereinafter Kaswan, Environmen-
tal Justice]. The inability of market mechanisms to optimize distributional im-
pacts is a central environmental justice concern. See id. 
 277 See AM. LUNG ASSOC., STATE OF THE AIR 2017 4 (2017), 
http://www.lung.org/assets/documents/healthy-air/state-of-the-air/state-of-the-
air-2017.pdf (reporting that 38.9% of the U.S. population (125 million people) 
live in areas that fail to meet air quality standards for ozone and particulate mat-
ter). 
 278 See infra notes 417–19 and accompanying text (noting that economists’ 
preference for single-issue approaches might maximize the efficiency of resolving 
that single issue but fail to provide an optimal solution where a multiplicity of 
issues are raised by a given industry or practice). The San Francisco Bay Area’s 
integrated greenhouse gas and co-pollutant plan provides an example of integrated 
planning. See BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., supra note 275. 
 279 See ROBERT POLLIN, JEANNETTE WICKS-LIM & HEIDI GARRETT-PELTIER, 
GREEN PROSPERITY: HOW CLEAN-ENERGY POLICIES CAN FIGHT POVERTY AND 
RAISE LIVING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5–7 (2009), 
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/glo_09062504a.pdf. 
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provide socioeconomic benefits if coupled with job training pro-
grams in communities with high unemployment.280 As noted above, 
disadvantaged communities seek not only jobs, but access to the ef-
ficiency investments and distributed renewables that can reduce 
household energy bills and allow all communities to participate in a 
clean energy transition.281 
Government entities are also better positioned than private enti-
ties to weigh and resolve the inevitable tradeoffs among energy 
strategies.282 There is no silver bullet. As noted above, wind energy 
could hurt birds.283 Natural gas production increasingly relies upon 
fracking, which presents a mix of economic opportunities and envi-
ronmental threats.284 The variability of renewable sources will re-
quire difficult strategic decisions about how to manage intermit-
tency on the path to clean energy. For example, David Spence ob-
serves that, should the eastern states forego developing natural gas 
or nuclear capacity, they could end up using their existing coal-fired 
resources as back-up power, leading to greater carbon and co-pollu-
tant emissions than would have occurred had they invested in natural 
gas.285 He notes that other backup options, like various forms of 
                                                                                                             
 280 See id. 
 281 See JACQUI PATTERSON ET AL., NAACP, JUST ENERGY POLICIES: 
REDUCING POLLUTION AND CREATING JOBS, (2014), http://www.naacp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Just-Energy-Policies-Compendium-EXECUTIVE-
SUMMARY_NAACP.pdf; Behles, supra note 101; Outka, Fairness, supra note 
273, at 812–13; Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 40–45); Forum on Climate 
Change, supra note 273. As discussed below, California has enacted multiple pro-
visions to direct clean energy environmental and economic benefits to disadvan-
taged communities. See infra Section IV.C. 
 282 See Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 21–22) (noting that regulations 
are better suited to addressing policies that require a consideration of risk/risk 
tradeoffs than price-based mechanisms). 
 283 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 10. 
 284 See Wiseman, supra note 87, at 736; see also Michael B. Gerrard, What 
Does Environmental Justice Mean in an Era of Global Climate Change?, 19 J. 
ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 278, 301–02 (2013) (describing difficult risk trade-
offs presented by climate change mitigation options). 
 285 See Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, at 471–74. Spence observes that 
coal is not only more polluting when operating; coal-fired power plants do not 
ramp up and down efficiently, and so could end up running even when their power 
is not being used, and then running inefficiently when they must suddenly increase 
and decrease generation. See id. at 462. The risk of coal as a back-up power source 
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storage or variable nuclear power, are, at present, expensive, creat-
ing a tension between pollution control and cost.286 
From a larger political perspective, some view distributed gen-
eration and consumer control as a step toward a power shift from 
centralized utilities to more local control.287 As explained above, 
government policies like net metering, tax credits, financing rules, 
and smart grid development have played a significant role in pro-
moting such distributed opportunities, and local governments have 
fostered more localized control over generation sources through 
community choice aggregation entities.288 
At the same time, these initiatives have proved politically con-
troversial. A fraught issue at the time of this writing is the degree to 
which net metering and other policies favoring distributed genera-
tion benefit the rich who can afford to install renewables.289 Will 
income determine the ability to participate in clean energy,290 leav-
ing poorer residents and communities to pay for collective grid in-
frastructure and reliability costs? Or do all consumers benefit from 
some consumers’ distributed generation investments?291  Develop-
ments in the smart grid also raise equity concerns, as policymakers 
consider pricing and technology policies to control energy use that 
might be unavailable to and impose higher costs on low-income con-
sumers.292 Whatever the merits of a shift to distributed resources and 
                                                                                                             
is smaller in the west because the western states rely more on natural gas. Id. at 
464. 
 286 See Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, at 463, 469. 
 287 See TOMAIN, supra note 107, at 193–213; WEINRUB & GIANCATARINO, su-
pra note 106, at 4. 
 288 See supra notes 236–41 and accompanying text. 
 289 See Welton, supra note 97, at 634–35. 
 290 See id. 
 291 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 154; Outka, Fairness, supra note 
273, at 808–13; Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO 
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 117–18 (2015); Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, 
at 476–77 (describing the “Fairness Paradox” inherent in distributed generation); 
Welton, supra note 97, at 594–96 (discussing debate over the impact of net me-
tering on poorer utility customers). As distributed electricity storage technology 
develops, it becomes increasingly possible that consumers with sufficient means 
could go off the grid entirely, increasing the potential impact on poorer customers 
who must continue to rely on, and pay for, the grid. See id. at 601–02. 
 292 See Welton, supra note 97, at 631–33. To address the risk of income dis-
parities in access to clean energy opportunities, Welton advocates for a “clean 
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more local control, government institutions could play a central role 
in addressing access, ensuring reliability, addressing the distribution 
of costs, and adjusting utilities’ changing role. 
From a socioeconomic perspective, decarbonization will nega-
tively impact workers and businesses in the fossil fuel industry;293 
workers and businesses in new industries will experience gains.294 
The recently emerging “just transitions” movement has focused on 
the importance of transitioning workers in the fossil fuel economy 
to new opportunities in clean energy.295 While “the market” can 
manage such transitions to some degree, as unemployed people 
move to new opportunities on their own, or as government programs 
respond to market-induced dislocation, a governmental role in an-
ticipating displacements and facilitating the transition could more 
effectively reduce adverse consequences and maximize benefits. 
In addition, to the degree some measures increase energy costs, 
carefully planned government programs could alleviate impacts on 
the poor, by, for example, subsidizing energy efficiency retrofits in 
poor households, to allow poor households to lower energy use and 
keep energy expenditures constant, notwithstanding increasing 
prices.296 To address this need, government decision-makers could 
                                                                                                             
electrification” commitment extending opportunities to all, similar to the electri-
fication ambitions of earlier public utility initiatives. See id. at 640–42. 
 293 See Anabella Rosemberg, Building a Just Transition: The Linkages Be-
tween Climate Change and Employment, 2 INT’L J. LAB. RES. 125, 134–36 (2010); 
see also supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting job losses likely to be as-
sociated with an energy transition). 
 294 See Rosemberg, supra note 293, at 134, 137–39; see also supra notes 95–
96 and accompanying text (noting new employment opportunities associated with 
an energy transition). 
 295 See generally David J. Doorey, Just Transitions Law: Putting Labour Law 
to Work on Climate Change, 30 CAN. J. ENVTL. L. & PRACTICE 201 (2017); Ger-
rard, supra note 284, at 302; Rosemberg, supra note 293, at 140–48; see also 
McGinley, supra note 95, at 401–03 (discussing impact of multiple environmental 
regulations on the coal industry and coal workers); Forum on Climate Change, 
supra note 273 (discussing the principle of creating the opportunity for all Amer-
icans to experience a just transition and ensuring that the green economy has 
enough jobs for those who have been historically been chronically underem-
ployed). 
 296 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 10, 70; DREHOBL & ROSS, supra 
note 99, at 25–28; see also Forum on Climate Change, supra note 273 (“[Princi-
ple] 8. Provide an economic and social safety net for low-income, people-of-color, 
Indigenous Peoples and those vulnerable in the middle-income from the structural 
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opt for a limited market-based mechanism to generate revenue, as 
California and the eastern states’ trading programs have done.297 
Whatever the merits of these difficult debates, government insti-
tutions can play a central role.298 Rather than leaving many of these 
determinations to the fortuities of largely private choices, or ad-
dressing them only by governmental reactions to private initiatives, 
government legislative or administrative processes could provide 
deliberative fora for more systemic debates.299 
B.  Long-term Planning and Transformation 
Whether at the macro or the micro level, electricity-sector plan-
ning, generation investments, transmission development, and distri-
bution systems require extensive preparation and coordination. Set-
ting an emissions cap or carbon tax and then expecting atomized 
decisions by solo actors—even major actors like utilities—to 
achieve the target cannot replicate the systematic conceptualization 
and regulation necessary to re-craft the electricity sector.300 As Wil-
liams and his co-authors state, it is necessary to “[h]ave a plan[;] . . . . 
                                                                                                             
adjustments in the economy as we transition from the pollution generating fossil 
fuel economy to the green, clean and renewable economy.”). It should be noted 
that the same measures could also be enacted if prices increased due to market 
measures, not just prescriptive measures. 
 297 See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41836, THE 
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 12 (2017) (describing allocation of eastern states’ trading program rev-
enue for energy efficiency and renewable energy); see also Disadvantaged Com-
munities, CAL. CLIMATE INV., http://www.caclimateinvestments.ca.gov/disad-
vantaged-communities/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (describing use of California 
cap-and-trade program’s auction revenue to help disadvantaged communities). 
 298 The Environmental Justice Leadership Forum on Climate Change’s “Prin-
ciples of Climate Justice” emphasize the importance of emission reduction mech-
anisms “that are controlled by the public sector.” See Forum on Climate Change, 
supra note 273 (emphasis added). 
 299 Cf. Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, at 481 (responding to those who 
argue that transitioning to a clean energy transition will be straightforward, 
Spence argues that “it would be better if policymakers tackled these reliability and 
cost questions head-on, and chose their favored transition paths with explicit 
recognition of the potential environmental, cost, and distributional effects of their 
choices”). 
 300 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 12 (“[d]eferring all responsibility to 
a carbon market or relying on ad hoc decision-making and inconsistent incentives 
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[d]eep decarbonization will not occur as a byproduct of undirected 
market activity. Planning is required to coordinate decarbonization 
measures within and across sectors, regions, and time periods.”301 
1. GOVERNANCE AND LONG-TERM PLANNING                                 
AND TRANSFORMATION 
To effectively decarbonize, some overarching vision of the end-
game is necessary. And to achieve that vision, policymakers and 
regulators need to carefully assemble the jigsaw puzzle pieces; they 
will not fall into place on their own. Markets can create incentives 
and encourage some aspects of the transition, but they cannot repli-
cate the larger-scale vision and coordination government institutions 
can provide. As noted above, many states have begun this process 
with climate action plans302 —plans that may not yet fully grapple 
with full decarbonization, but which reflect the states’ institutional 
capacity to conceptualize a vision and consider pathways for achiev-
ing it. 
In addition to macro-level long-term planning, government plan-
ning and regulation of many facets of electricity generation and dis-
tribution will be necessary. New generation will not emerge if it is 
not coordinated with transmission investments and if access to trans-
mission is not facilitated through fair rules and careful oversight.303 
Utilities and power companies do not make generation and trans-
mission investments solely on the basis of a price signal; their return 
on investment is determined by the way regulators have structured 
                                                                                                             
will not produce a sustained long-term transition”); Boyd, supra note 2, at 1692; 
Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 1013. 
 301 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 72; see also Dernbach, supra note 1, at 
10788 (suggesting that policies should focus less on what is currently feasible and, 
instead, start with the desired result and “backcast” to identify the steps needed to 
get there). 
 302 See supra Section II.B.2.b. 
 303 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 14–15 (observing that the most 
abundant renewable energy resources are not located near existing populations or 
existing transmission corridors); id. at 74–85 (describing numerous FERC initia-
tives to encourage long-term planning for adequate transmission and ensure fair 
access and pricing); id. at 176–81 (describing numerous FERC initiatives to in-
crease access to transmission lines and encourage a fair market for energy gener-
ation and transmission). 
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payments in electricity markets and by utilities’ rate structures.304 
Commentators recognize that, under current rules, greater penetra-
tion of renewables will undermine future investments, requiring reg-
ulatory agencies to rethink and restructure electricity markets and 
rate-making rules.305 
The variability of renewables also creates new challenges to re-
liability and a balanced grid that will require government planning 
and coordination to resolve.306 Multiple options are possible, includ-
ing expanded transmission networks with redundant capacity so that 
sources in one area can cover when others are not producing,307 
mechanisms to reduce consumer demand when needed,308 new en-
ergy storage technologies,309 or backup fossil fuel power plants.310 
A carbon price alone, operating through electricity markets, cannot 
resolve these questions. 
And interactions among resources and sectors will be critical; 
for example, water needed for centralized steam-generation power 
                                                                                                             
 304 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1618, 1688 (observing that “[c]urrent auction 
designs in the wholesale power markets create additional challenges for efforts to 
drive investments into low-carbon alternatives”). 
 305 According to Boyd, under the existing price structure, adding renewables 
to the generation mix undermines future investment in renewables or other expen-
sive generation sources. See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1688–89. The wholesale mar-
ket price is determined by the marginal cost of energy supplied. See id. Because 
renewables cost little to operate, they are used first, promoting renewables use 
over other sources. See id. But adding more renewables to supply is likely to lower 
the marginal costs, and the prices generators receive. See id. That, in turn, hurts 
the ability of new generators to obtain a return on their investment and jeopardizes 
continued financing for renewables. See id.; see also Spence, Paradoxes, supra 
note 52, at 464–67 (explaining “the ‘missing money’ problem” that increasing 
renewables will drive down prices, decreasing the ability of generators to raise 
capital for new investments, and noting that this trend will trigger “the need for 
more administrative intervention into the market for new supply”); WILLIAMS ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 86. 
 306 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1627, 1700–01; Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 
52, at 468. 
 307 See Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, at 468–69 (observing that large 
grids would even out risks). 
 308 See id. at 464; Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 
887, 926–30 (2016) [hereinafter Stein, Distributed Reliability]. 
 309 See Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, at 462–63; Stein, Distributed Reli-
ability, supra note 308, at 916–26. 
 310 Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 52, at 461–62. 
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plants, including solar, will require planning that integrates water 
and energy considerations.311 Moreover, the demands on the elec-
tricity sector are not static. As transportation and buildings move 
toward electrification to reduce carbon, the demands on the electric-
ity sector will increase substantially,312 and agencies and entities re-
sponsible for electricity must integrate projections based on devel-
opments in other sectors. 
Nor is the market alone likely to drive necessary and appropriate 
transmission capacity, due to fragmented control by states and ex-
isting rules that limit how transmission developers are paid for their 
investment in transmission lines.313 Consumer distributed genera-
tion and smart grid investments require planning, coordination, and 
innovative ratemaking techniques to be properly integrated into the 
electricity system. As Boyd makes clear, incorporating variable re-
newable energy and distributed resources effectively and reliably 
will require more, not less, of the extensive planning and coordina-
tion that government institutions can foster.314 
2. THE LIMITS OF RELYING ON A CARBON PRICE TO GENERATE     
LONG-TERM PLANNING AND ACHIEVE TRANSFORMATION 
But, conceding the importance of planning, could a carbon price 
prompt existing utility and private stakeholders to engage in the nec-
essary planning? A carbon price would not fall on a blank slate; it 
could intersect with existing electricity-sector planning exercises. 
Or, more broadly, could the invisible hand of a market price on car-
bon push investments into the best paths, without the need for ex-
tensive government direction? 
a.  The Effectiveness of a Carbon Price on Existing                
Planning Mechanisms 
State legislatures, PUCs, and FERC have all required most util-
ities and RTOs to engage in planning, such as integrated resource 
plans, long-term procurement plans, and regional transmission 
                                                                                                             
 311 See KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 72, at 14. 
 312 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 65 fig.34. 
 313 See Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 1020–23. 
 314 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1683. 
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plans,315 but will these processes suffice to achieve decarbonization? 
To be sure, a carbon price could play a helpful role in steering plan-
ning entities toward low-carbon choices. However, at least as cur-
rently operating, even a robust carbon price is unlikely to lead to 
adequate planning for decarbonization.316 IRP planning processes 
differ considerably in the range and specificity of issues utilities 
must consider, and will not necessarily lead to plans capable of 
achieving decarbonization.317 Although utilities could, in theory, in-
corporate current and projected future increases in carbon prices in 
their future planning, those prices are likely to be shrouded in un-
certainty.318 And the planning horizons, particularly the ten-year ho-
rizons associated with long-term procurement plans, may be too 
short.319 One study suggests that IRPs have a poor record in incor-
porating potential future environmental controls and their im-
pacts.320 Unless and until states or the federal government impose 
more concrete goals and specifications, an uncertain price, on its 
own, is unlikely to push utility and RTO planning to the extent nec-
essary to plan for decarbonization321 and is unlikely to induce the 
larger systemic planning that decarbonization will require. 
                                                                                                             
 315 See supra note 213 and accompanying text (IRP planning), note 215 and 
accompanying text (long-term procurement planning); and notes 245–47 and ac-
companying text (describing state and FERC transmission planning require-
ments). 
 316 One commentator notes that current integrated resource planning is insuf-
ficient to achieve long-term sustainability, in part due to the lack of a clear sus-
tainability goal. See Pamela Lesh, Planning for the Future, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 45, 
48 (2009). Lesh states: “[I]t becomes fair and necessary to ask how [the planning 
processes we are using] best can serve us going forward into the next decades.” 
Id. Her answer, with current IRP processes, is a resounding no. See generally id. 
 317 See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 213, at 4–5, 7 (describing variety of 
considerations states require in IRPs). 
 318 See id. at 31. 
 319 See id. at 30. 
 320 See id. (noting that “few utilities” incorporate potential future environmen-
tal regulations and their impacts into their IRPs “in a comprehensive manner”). 
 321 An example from an existing local trading program is illustrative. Design-
ers of a market-based program to control criteria pollutants in Los Angeles had 
expected that the program’s steadily tightening cap would prompt utilities to en-
gage in long-term compliance planning and adopt needed pollution-control tech-
nologies. See McAllister, supra note 142, at 292–97 (describing regulators’ ex-
pectations of industry planning and pollution control, expectations that were frus-
trated by low allowance prices, inadequate information, and a lack of interest in 
2018] ENERGY, GOVERNANCE, AND MARKET MECHANISMS 539 
 
b. Can the Market’s Invisible Hand Substitute for Planning? 
More broadly, we confront the question of whether a carbon 
price alone would trigger investments that could lead to decarboni-
zation. On a practical level, as market advocates would agree, a car-
bon price would have to be accompanied by extensive planning to 
coordinate generation, transmission, and distribution, and, given the 
existing role of government in rate-making and other features of 
electricity operation, government institutions would have to manage 
the economic and reliability implications of investments. But can we 
at least rely upon a carbon price to trigger the fundamental and un-
derlying energy choices, like whether to invest in natural gas and its 
infrastructure, in wind, or in other sources? 
Even assuming a robust carbon price, the price uncertainty in a 
cap-and-trade program could impede large-scale decarbonizing in-
vestments, since cap-and-trade programs specify only the emissions 
cap, not the cost of allowances.322 Allowance prices are likely to be 
affected by not only the cap’s stringency and the availability of low-
cost abatement options, but by a multiplicity of uncertain factors like 
economic growth, population, and weather patterns, all of which sig-
nificantly affect electricity demand and, for renewable resources, 
electricity supply. In addition, for power companies selling into 
wholesale markets, the likelihood of selling power depends upon the 
array of other sources bidding into the system over time, leading to 
                                                                                                             
or ability to engage in long-term planning and investments). However, utilities 
and other participating companies purchased inexpensive allowances instead of 
adopting pollution controls. Id. at 293–94. And regulators had to affirmatively 
require control measures and review long-term compliance plans in order to 
achieve long-term emission reduction goals. Id. at 309–10. 
 322 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81 (noting that “[c]arbon prices are 
an unstable price signal for attracting large-scale, long-term capital investment, 
which is essential to deep decarbonization”); See Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 
supra note 59, at 1008–11 (describing how uncertainty regarding costs can chill 
generation investments). Cap-and-trade programs can establish both carbon price 
floors and ceilings to contain price uncertainty. See HARRISON FELL ET AL., SOFT 
AND HARD PRICE COLLARS IN A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM 1 (2010). However, 
such floors and ceilings are likely to span a significant range of potential prices. 
See id. at 1–3. In contrast, carbon taxes provide greater price certainty. But, even 
under a carbon tax, the electricity sector faces the risk that a given tax will be 
changed in the future to better meet carbon reduction goals. For example, if a 
given tax level is failing to reduce emissions sufficiently, a jurisdiction could in-
crease the tax to encourage additional reductions. 
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endemic uncertainty about the ability to obtain a return on invest-
ment and increasing the cost of financing.323 And although carbon 
taxes provide greater price certainty in theory, regulated entities face 
the possibility that, if a tax-setting entity finds the tax insufficient to 
goad needed change, the tax rate could be revised. 
Moreover, carbon prices may not be fully effective in guiding 
energy investment decisions and behavior because of the wide range 
of factors that affect investment decisions, including but not limited 
to a carbon price.324 In traditional, vertically-integrated states, the 
ability to pass costs along to consumers could render utilities in 
these states less sensitive to carbon price signals.325 In competitive 
contexts, power companies are unlikely to incorporate potential 
long-term prices as they respond to more immediate shareholder 
pressures.326 And recent analysis suggests that, absent governmental 
support and direction, private sector innovation tends to build incre-
mentally upon itself rather than risking the more transformative 
steps necessary to achieve decarbonization.327 
All this assumes a sufficient carbon price. But what is the likeli-
hood of achieving the price levels considered necessary to induce 
transformative change in the electricity sector? An international eco-
nomic analysis of the carbon prices required to achieve the objec-
tives of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change suggests that, 
worldwide, a price of at least $40 to $80 per ton of carbon dioxide 
is necessary by 2020, and $50 to $100 per ton of carbon dioxide is 
necessary by 2030.328 Given the immediate political and economic 
                                                                                                             
 323 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81. 
 324 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (describing a variety of fac-
tors affecting investment decisions); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81 (ob-
serving that “[p]rice signals are very imperfectly refracted through fragmented 
energy markets, many segments of which are highly inelastic with regard to 
price”). 
 325 See DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT: A GUIDE FOR ECONOMISTS 13 (2011) (noting that utilities’ abil-
ity to pass costs through to consumers could render them less sensitive to price 
signals). 
 326 See TOMAIN, supra note 107, at 105. 
 327 See generally Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 135. 
 328 CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL., REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL 
COMMISSION ON CARBON PRICES 5 (2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54ff9c5ce4b0a53decccfb4c/t/5949402936e
5d3af64b94bab/1497972781902/ENGLISH+EX+SUM+CarbonPricing.pdf. 
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consequences of a high carbon price, analysts are skeptical that pol-
icymakers would establish market mechanisms that generate carbon 
prices high enough to induce needed change.329 Utilities and power 
companies are well-organized and likely to be influential in political 
and administrative settings,330 and policymakers could fear con-
sumer backlash if they impose a hefty price on carbon. Without a 
sufficient carbon price, power companies and utilities will be 
tempted to purchase inexpensive allowances or make only modest, 
but not transformative, investments, slowing if not blocking the path 
to decarbonization.331 
Recently proposed and operating carbon pricing programs pro-
vide a case in point. Although the Clean Power Plan is currently in 
limbo, analysts assessing its projected impact concluded that, if 
states chose to fulfill the requirements through cap-and-trade pro-
grams, actual emissions would be less than the interim caps in the 
                                                                                                             
They note that existing carbon pricing programs in North America and Europe 
feature carbon prices below $10/ton of carbon dioxide, far short of the necessary 
levels. Id. at 6. The authors emphasize the need to not only have a strong current 
price signal, but “a credible commitment to maintain prices high enough in the 
future to deliver the required changes.” Id. at 4. 
 329 See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 144, at 194–96; Christoph Bertram et 
al., Complementing Carbon Prices with Technology to Keep Climate Targets 
Within Reach, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 235, 235 (2015); Denniss et al., supra 
note 161, at 33; Görlach, supra note 161, at 738, 742–43 (describing political 
impediments to setting sufficiently high price); Jenkins, supra note 144, 469–72 
(describing multiple “political economy” constraints, on both the energy producer 
and consumer sides, that reduce the likelihood that policymakers will develop cli-
mate policies that establish an adequate carbon price); Mormann, supra note 211, 
at 1624; Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 38–40); see also Mark Jaccard, 
Want an Effective Climate Policy? Heed the Evidence, POL’Y OPTIONS (Feb. 2, 
2016) http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/february-2016/want-an-effective-
climatepolicy-heed-the-evidence/ (describing Canadian governments’ unwilling-
ness to impose a carbon tax high enough to motivate needed change). 
 330 See Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 
SCIENCE 1170, 1170 (2015). 
 331 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 14 (stating that “[c]arbon prices have 
a role to play in the policy toolkit, but by themselves are unlikely to provide a 
sufficiently stable or large signal to drive the long-term investments required for 
deep decarbonization”); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and 
Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 
9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 276–78 (1999) (suggesting that, under cap-
and-trade programs, companies avoid innovation by purchasing credits). 
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early years of the program,332 and by its end-date, 2030, allowance 
prices would range from low to negligible.333  That outcome is not 
surprising given the CPP’s modest objectives.334 
And so far, all of the existing carbon trading programs have had 
low allowance prices and modest price-induced innovation.335 The 
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) has featured 
low to negligible allowance prices,336 and the European Union is 
still struggling to improve the ETS’ effectiveness. In the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade program cover-
ing the electricity sector in several northeastern and mid-Atlantic 
states, actual emissions have often been below the emissions cap337 
and the “reserve price” to maintain a price despite weak demand has 
generated only a very low price signal of around $2 per ton.338       
Although electricity generation during the RGGI program shifted 
significantly from coal and toward natural gas, it is not clear whether 
                                                                                                             
 332 Jennifer Macedonia et al., Modeling the Evolving Power Sector and Im-
pacts of the Final Clean Power Plan, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (June 2016), 
http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BPC-Energy-Clean-
Power-Plan-Modeling.pdf. 
 333 See id. at 33–34. Prices are lowest in the Eastern Interconnect and in Texas, 
representing a substantial majority of the nation’s emissions. See id. 
 334 Low allowance prices are unsurprising because, in developing the Clean 
Power Plan, EPA did not incorporate many of the available and achievable reduc-
tions it had identified in developing its performance standards. See ALICE 
KASWAN & KIRSTEN ENGEL, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, UNTAPPED 
POTENTIAL: THE CARBON REDUCTIONS LEFT OUT OF EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN 
4–10 (2016), http://progressivereform.org/articles/Untapped_Potential_CPP_
1607.pdf. 
 335 See Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 38). 
 336 Boyd, supra note 2, at 1691–92. The ETS emissions targets in the early 
years were higher than existing emissions, a consequence of inaccurate target-
setting and economic recession. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation 
Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
395, 411–12 (2009) (describing overallocation in EU ETS’ early years); Kaswan, 
Industrial Pollution, supra note 273, at 102–03 (describing overly lax caps in the 
EU ETS and RGGS trading programs). 
 337 See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41836, THE 
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 8–9 (2017) (describing and depicting relationship between the emis-
sions cap and actual emissions). Although the cap has been adjusted, prices re-
main low. Id. 
 338 See RAMSEUR, supra note 337, at 11 (describing reserve price of approxi-
mately $2 per ton). 
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the low carbon price played a significant role in that shift.339 Carbon 
prices in California’s carbon trading program, in allowance auctions 
and on the secondary market, have been at or close to the state’s 
price floor in the low teens, even after a recent extension of the pro-
gram.340 The ETS, RGGI, and California have all taken legislative 
and administrative steps to tighten emissions caps,341 but allowance 
prices in all three jurisdictions remain low.342 It is unclear whether 
                                                                                                             
 339 Tyler Hodge, Natural Gas Expected to Surpass Coal in Mix of Fuel Used 
for U.S. Power Generation in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY ENERGY 
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25392. RGGI 
states’ reliance on coal-fired power decreased from 33% in 2005 to 7% in 2016. 
See RAMSEUR, supra note 337, at 6. To replace coal-fired power, RGGI states 
turned primarily to natural gas, which increased from 25% in 2005 to 43% in 
2016. See id. at 7 fig.3 (showing relative shifts in energy sources from 2005 to 
2016). However, the degree to which that shift is attributable to the allowance 
prices is unclear. Some argue that the RGGI program’s low allowance price 
played an important role in utilities’ shifts away from coal-fired power and overall 
emission reductions. See id. at 7 (citing studies analyzing RGGI’s role in electric-
ity generation shifts). However, other forces, including economic recession, de-
creasing natural gas prices, and increased regulatory costs for coal-fired power 
likely played an important role. See id. The same shift away from coal might well 
have occurred without the RGGI program’s low allowance prices. 
 340 See Busch, Carbon Prices Rise, supra note 159. In May 2017, current al-
lowances sold for $13.80 per allowance. California Cap-and-Trade Program, 
Summary of Joint Action Settlement Prices and Results, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/results_summary.pdf (last up-
dated Nov. 2017). 
 341 See RAMSEUR, supra note 337, at 8 (describing RGGI’s revised and tight-
ened emissions cap commencing in 2014). The EU is working on its latest efforts 
to tighten the emissions gap and increase allowance prices. See Daniel Boffey, 
Reform of EU Carbon Trading Scheme Agreed, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2017, 3:08 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/28/reform-of-eu-car-
bon-trading-scheme-agreed. California has established a more demanding long-
term emissions target (40% below 1990 emissions). See Jennifer Medina & Matt 
Richtel, California’s Emissions Goal Is a ‘Milestone’ on Climate Efforts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/us/californias-
emissions-goal-is-a-milestone-on-climate-efforts.html (describing 2016 legisla-
tion). A year later, the state explicitly extended its cap-and-trade program to 2030. 
See Chris Megerian, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Law to Extend Cap and Trade, Se-
curing the Future of California’s Key Climate Program, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 
2017, 3:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-jerry-brown-climate-
change-law-20170725-story.html. 
 342 Notwithstanding a significantly tighter emissions cap, in spring 2017, 
RGGI allowance prices dropped to $3, just above the reserve price of around $2 
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these or other jurisdictions will have the political will to increase 
carbon prices to a level that would induce the innovation necessary 
to achieve decarbonization.343 
In sum, although, as discussed below, carbon prices could play 
a helpful role in inducing planning and investments, they cannot 
provide sufficient planning, and the invisible hand of the market is 
unlikely to be strong or coordinated enough to achieve the level of 
decarbonization that is necessary.344 While there is no guarantee that 
government institutions developing climate and decarbonization 
plans will be immune to the political forces that have dampened car-
bon prices, they can establish clearer goals and roadmaps than can 
be accomplished through the vagaries of price signals. 
C.   Governance and Overcoming Utility Resistance 
If state governments take a hands-off approach to energy source 
choices and rely largely on a carbon price, utilities and existing 
power companies are likely to be the primary players. But that con-
trol could impede some desirable energy transition paths that are un-
likely to be initiated willingly by utilities, and so require a govern-
ment push. For example, in some jurisdictions, utilities have little 
incentive to adopt energy efficiency programs because they reduce 
revenue from electricity sales and face regulatory hurdles that make 
                                                                                                             
per allowance. See O. Nilay Manzagol, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Auc-
tion Prices are the Lowest Since 2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 31, 
2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31432. Although Chris 
Busch sees the market improving over previous levels (when many allowances 
remained unsold and those that were sold were sold at the reserve price), the recent 
allowance price of $13.80 per allowance was only 23 cents over the price floor. 
Busch, Carbon Prices Rise, supra note 159. 
 343 See generally Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 144, at 194–96 (expressing 
skepticism that policymakers will set carbon prices high enough to induce needed 
change); Görlach, supra note 161, at 743 (same). British Columbia, which 
adopted a modest carbon tax in 2008, decided against increasing the tax beyond 
its initial levels. See Jaccard, supra note 329. 
 344 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1618 (stating that “markets alone will have dif-
ficulty providing” the planning and financing needed to build low-carbon gener-
ation and “modernize the electric power grid,” and observing that coordinating 
renewable and distributed generation sources “will require a degree of administra-
tion and oversight that exceeds current systems operation capabilities”). 
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implementation challenging and uncertain.345 And some utilities 
have perceived increasing distributed generation as a threat to their 
viability and may be unwilling to facilitate integration of distributed 
resources into the grids they manage.346 In contrast, affirmative gov-
ernance could better coordinate the range of appropriate initiatives 
and facilitate transitions in utility regulation that accommodate and 
rationalize these new opportunities. 
D.  Governance and Democratic Virtues 
The private sector undoubtedly values the autonomy of market-
based measures, which give them the freedom to make investment 
and emissions choices so long as they present sufficient allowances 
or pay a required tax. But that advantage to industry is a disad-
vantage for public engagement and democratic accountability.347 
                                                                                                             
 345 See Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward in High Heels”: Examining and Ad-
dressing the Disparate Regulatory Treatment of Energy Efficiency and Renewa-
ble Resources, 43 ENVTL. L. 255, 276–78 (2013) (explaining industry reluctance 
to embrace energy efficiency given difficulties in recovering costs, measuring de-
mand reductions, and meeting regulatory requirements to demonstrate cost-effec-
tiveness); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The 
Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 
1545–48 (2012) (describing utility disincentives to promote energy efficiency); 
Dick Munson, As Utilities Embrace Change, FirstEnergy’s Strategy Is Resistance 
and Protectionism, GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/as-utilities-embrace-change-firstenergys-strat-
egy-is-resistance-and-protect. 
 346 See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 2, at 1677–79 (describing utilities’ perception 
of distributed generation as a threat and their efforts to limit distributed genera-
tion); Rule, supra note 291, at 117–26 (same). Utilities are not only unlikely to 
facilitate energy efficiency and renewables, they are attempting to erect barriers 
to distributed generation in a number of states. See id. at 118–19; Welton, supra 
note 56 (manuscript at 26–28) (observing that utilities are likely to resist con-
sumer-generated power); Welton, supra note 97, at 592–95 (describing utilities’ 
challenges to net metering programs around the country). While some of these 
efforts may reflect legitimate concerns about energy reliability and the utilities’ 
ability to maintain necessary infrastructure, some of these initiatives could also 
reflect the desire to suppress competition. 
 347 Environmental justice advocates have gone so far as to state that: “Trading 
is undemocratic, secretive, and excludes the public from decision-making about 
whether and how to address greenhouse gas emissions.” The Cap-and-Trade Cha-
rade for Climate Change, EJ MATTERS, www.ejmatters.org/docs/Reasons.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2017); see also The California Environmental Justice Move-
ment’s Declaration in Support of Carbon Pricing Reform in California, CAL. AIR 
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Although government decisions about emissions caps and the over-
arching structure of market-based mechanisms present participatory 
opportunities, market-based mechanisms offer limited opportunities 
for participation in choices about specific energy sources. The de-
velopment of climate action plans, decisions about RPSs, energy ef-
ficiency goals, and implementation measures all generate opportu-
nities for public participation and create at least some measure of 
public accountability. From a governance perspective, that public 
role—whether by legislators, government officials, or the public it-
self in public hearings—is a central advantage of planning and reg-
ulatory approaches.348 
To be sure, even under a market-based approach, many utility 
and private energy generation siting decisions are subject to govern-
mental approvals that are likely to include opportunities for public 
                                                                                                             
RES. BOARD (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/meetings/
02142017/20170215ca-ej-declaration-on-carbon-pricing-reform-approved.pdf 
(stating that “carbon trading is undemocratic because it allows entrenched pollut-
ers, market designers, and commodity traders to determine whether and where to 
reduce greenhouse gases and co-pollutant emissions without allowing impacted 
communities or governments to participate in those decisions”). To the extent that 
greenhouse gas trading or taxes could allow some plants to increase pollution, the 
planned increases could potentially trigger standard permitting processes, pro-
cesses that would include some measure of public participation. However, in-
creases due to additional hours of operation (like more frequent use of existing 
natural gas plants) do not usually trigger permitting requirements, which are based 
on the rate of emissions, not absolute emissions. Moreover, the critical question 
is often about where reductions, and associated pollution benefits, will occur, not 
simply where increases occur. Decisions to maintain rather than reduce emissions 
would not trigger permitting processes and associated public engagement. See 
generally Kaswan, Environmental Justice, supra note 276, at 10299–303 (dis-
cussing intersection between co-pollutant regulation and carbon trading pro-
grams, the distribution of benefits, and participation). 
 348 See Forum on Climate Change, supra note 273 (“[Principle] 10: Ensure 
that people-of-color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities . . . have 
the inalienable right to have our voices shape what is the most significant policy 
debate of the 21st Century”); Görlach, supra note 161, at 736 (noting that “trans-
parency, public acceptance, and stakeholder participation” are important attrib-
utes to consider in choice of policy instruments); Kaswan, Environmental Justice, 
supra note 276, at 10302–03 (describing cap-and-trade programs’ participatory 
justice limits). 
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comment.349 However, if a state’s dominant approach is to evaluate 
the decisions that power companies and utilities have already made 
in response to carbon prices, then the PUC, and public participants 
in the PUC’s approval process, will be much more passive than they 
would be if they had a more robust role in determining the state’s 
energy future. 
Public engagement in governmental energy planning and deci-
sion-making could take multiple forms that vary significantly in the 
degree of public participation and accountability. Where a state leg-
islature enacts a renewable portfolio standard, representative de-
mocracy is at work. Although the public is not directly engaged, 
lawmakers have some degree of accountability to their electorate.350 
When state PUCs or energy commissions make decisions or issue 
rulings, then agency officials are accountable to the state’s elected 
officials, offering at least a tenuous degree of public accountability. 
With some variations, state requirements for utility integrated re-
source planning or long-term procurement plans often include op-
portunities for public participation during the utility planning pro-
cess and again during the PUC review process.351  FERC requires 
RTOs to engage in planning exercises that include multiple stake-
holders, including utilities, state officials, and other interested par-
ties.352 Although such highly technical proceedings are not for the 
                                                                                                             
 349 For example, new generators must obtain relevant land use and environ-
mental permits. See generally Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in En-
vironmental Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of 
Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 276–83, 286 (discussing en-
vironmental review and permitting programs incorporating public participation). 
In addition, utilities must obtain approval from PUCs for generation investments, 
rates, and other matters, some of which create at least some opportunity for public 
participation. See Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript 38–48) (discussing “access 
to process” in electricity sector decision-making). 
 350 In California, environmental justice organizations have worked closely 
with legislative allies to influence the shape of the state’s greenhouse gas policies. 
See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Lessons 
from the California Lawsuits, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 3–4 
(2014) [hereinafter Kaswan, California Lawsuits]; Julie Sze et al., Best in Show? 
Climate and Environmental Justice Policy in California, 2 ENVTL. JUST. 179, 
179–81 (2009). 
 351 See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 213, at 26–27. 
 352 See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consider-
ation of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional 
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faint of heart, and public engagement is primarily channeled through 
interest groups,353 citizens nonetheless have the opportunity to chan-
nel their views. At the other extreme, recent efforts to establish local 
control over decentralized energy resources maximize citizen con-
trol.354 
The nature and quality of public participation and public ac-
countability differs markedly in each of these settings, and assessing 
the value and drawbacks to participation in each is an important area 
for further research.355 For the purposes of this Article, however, the 
central argument is that, compared with market mechanisms’ privat-
ized decision-making, these various governmental fora all offer 
greater opportunities to experience the virtues of democratic gov-
ernance: public participation, public accountability, and delibera-
tion. 
E.  Governance and Political Viability 
To some degree, the political viability of the decarbonization ob-
jective itself remains highly uncertain, whether we pursue market-
based mechanisms or more direct planning and prescriptive 
measures. Nonetheless, it is worth considering the relative political 
viability of market versus prescriptive measures. 
Cap-and-trade programs have been assumed to present the polit-
ical sweet spot to date, providing environmentalists with an emis-
sions cap and industry with a cost-effective approach and malleable 
design features.356 More recently, at the federal level, limited bipar-
tisan support for a carbon tax is emerging.357 In addition to their as-
sumed cost-effectiveness attributes, cap-and-trade  and tax programs 
                                                                                                             
Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 568–70 (2007) (describing 
stakeholder participation in RTO decision-making). 
 353 See Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 46–47). 
 354 See id. (manuscript at 34–45) (noting citizen-control element of the energy 
democracy movement); Tomain, supra note 57, at 1134–45. 
 355 See, e.g., Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 352, at 583–86 (describing 
concerns about public representation in RTO decision-making). 
 356 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regula-
tion: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1550–55 (2007). 
 357 See Arianna Skibell, Will Graham Support for Carbon Tax Spur Senate 
Action?, GREENWIRE (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/green-
wire/2017/09/20/stories/1060061227. 
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provide a sense of neutrality; they do not single out particular indus-
tries for phase-out or appear to pick favorites. The “carbon price” 
provides a neutral government signal and carbon content, not poli-
tics, will determine the policy’s impact. However, except for a few 
states’ ambitious targets, existing caps and proposed caps have been 
light, and Congress’ one serious effort to enact a federal cap-and-
trade program ultimately failed.358 As noted above, policy analysts 
remain pessimistic that carbon prices will be set at levels that will 
achieve decarbonization.359 
This is not to say that most governance approaches to date have 
embraced decarbonization, although a few states have set relatively 
ambitious renewable portfolio standards.360 But, as we consider fu-
ture decarbonization policy options, prescriptive measures could 
have certain political advantages. Market-based controls start with a 
price tag; power companies, utilities, and consumers all perceive the 
“cost” of carbon.361 A low carbon price might pose relatively little 
threat, but attempts to impose a high cost would send a jarring and 
politically toxic message that is likely to spark strong resistance, 
particularly from well-organized vested interests.362 And, because 
market-based measures provide implementation flexibility, the pro-
posed carbon price would not be accompanied by an explicit vision 
of a low-carbon future or specify identifiable benefits, other than 
general promises that the air will be cleaner and climate change con-
sequences lessened.363 This political challenge is likely to plague ef-
forts to impose a sufficient carbon price. 
In contrast, planning and developing prescriptive measures to 
achieve a clean energy transition allows policymakers and stake-
holders to develop and conceptualize a vision for the future.364 Con-
ceptualizing pathways to a clean energy future would allow people 
                                                                                                             
 358 See John C. Dernbach & Robert Altenburg, Evolution of U.S. Climate Pol-
icy, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 83, 103–05 (Michael B. Gerrard 
& Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
 359 See supra note 331 and accompanying text. 
 360 See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing RPSs); Medina & 
Richtel, supra note 341. 
 361 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81. 
 362 See Roberts, supra note 75. 
 363 See id. 
 364 See id. 
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to connect climate policy to tangible quality of life issues, like em-
ployment opportunities, improved air quality, more efficient build-
ings and transportation, and the like.365 Although a clean energy vi-
sion could be threatening to the industries that appear destined to 
fade and their workers, other constituencies, including the public at 
large and fledgling energy companies already beginning a clean en-
ergy transition, could galvanize political support for a deep transi-
tion.366 
F.  Acknowledging Governance Deficits 
None of this is to say that governments necessarily get things 
right. Government institutions have deliberative capacities and the 
ability to engage in comprehensive and public-serving policies, but 
that does not guarantee results that serve the public interest. In fact, 
some market advocates might suggest that market measures to con-
trol carbon emissions would have more, not less, success in serving 
long-term public welfare because leaving decisions to the market 
would avoid inevitably distorted public decision-making.367 This 
view was reflected in the movement to deregulate the electricity sec-
tor, a movement that stemmed from a fundamental distrust of gov-
ernment agencies and the belief that free markets would better serve 
the public interest than “captured” agencies serving the industries 
they were assigned to regulate.368 
Both legislative and agency processes risk control by vested in-
terests.369 Utilities and fossil fuel companies already have consider-
able political influence and are likely to attempt to perpetuate their 
                                                                                                             
 365 See Meckling et al., supra note 330, at 1171. 
 366 Meckling and colleagues stress the critical role that green industries could 
play in mobilizing political support for a clean energy transition. See Meckling et 
al., supra note 330, at 1171; see also Roberts, supra note 75 (describing the need 
to develop coalitions of climate-friendly interests and the greater success this 
strategy would have over pure carbon pricing mechanisms). 
 367 See Black & Pierce, supra note 110, at 1341–42. 
 368 See generally id. at 1341. Boyd cogently describes the ideological under-
pinnings that prompted deregulation in a wide array of economic sectors, includ-
ing the electricity sector. See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1651–58. 
 369 See David E. Adelman & David B. Spence, Ideology vs. Interest Group 
Politics in U.S. Energy Policy, 95 N.C. L. REV. 339, 403–04 (2017). 
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control over energy resources.370 As noted above, certain measures, 
like energy efficiency and distributed generation, pose a particularly 
direct threat to utility control and are thus especially likely to be re-
sisted by powerful utilities.371 
Whether already vested interests or not, public legislatures and 
agencies will face pressure from “rent-seeking” industries, from old-
school fossil fuel companies and utilities, to new-school bio-
mass,372 solar, or wind energy companies.373 These industry pres-
sures could have an outsized degree of influence relative to the more 
diffuse public interest in sustainable and affordable energy.374      
Although public interest groups seek to channel the wider public in-
terest in particular outcomes, they do not always have the same re-
sources or clout as directly affected industries.375 
Furthermore, although recent public opinion suggests increasing 
public support for transitioning to clean energy,376 the transition will 
cause disruptions to some regions and industries, and public support 
is likely to vary in relation to the benefits and costs of transition in 
                                                                                                             
 370 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1624 (noting a “constellation of deeply en-
trenched political and economic interests, makes the system very resistant to 
change”); Adelman & Spence, supra note 369, at 403–04 (describing potential 
resistance to clean energy due to pressures from coal-associated interest groups). 
 371 See supra notes 345–46 and accompanying text. 
 372 For example, federal renewable fuel requirements are hotly contested, with 
some alleging that Midwestern corn growers’ political pressures, rather than clean 
air objectives, explain current ethanol requirements. See Robert W. Hahn, Etha-
nol: Law, Economics, and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 434, 461–63 (2008) 
(describing the role of the corn lobby and ethanol producers in successfully pro-
moting ethanol requirements). 
 373 Cf. Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Cli-
mate Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 399, 420–25 (2013) (observing that well-established renewable energy and 
energy efficiency programs created business support for retaining California’s cli-
mate program). 
 374 See Adelman & Spence, supra note 369, at 403–04. 
 375 See Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 52–56). 
 376 See Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, 2. Public Opinion on Renewables and 
Other Energy Sources, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/2016/10/04/public-opinion-on-renewables-and-other-energy-sources/ 
(stating that 89% that surveyed favor more solar power and 83% favor more wind 
power). 
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particular regions and to particular groups.377 Uncertainty about the 
location and scale of climate consequences render the benefits of 
climate change policies speculative and remote, in comparison with 
the more direct and immediate consequences of climate mitigation 
strategies, like loss of jobs in the fossil fuel sector.378 Moreover, cur-
rent citizens will inevitably reflect their own interests, not those of 
the future generations who will be most heavily impacted by climate 
change.379 
Notwithstanding the messiness and potential risks associated 
with the political process, however, engaging governance institu-
tions is preferable to relying solely on the individual decisions of 
private energy sector players responding to price signals. As Spence 
states, determining the public interest will always be “hotly con-
tested.”380 He adds, though, that “that does not negate the worthiness 
of pursuing that goal.”381 
Given the risk of outsized influence by industry interest groups, 
public engagement is essential. Campaigns to increase public aware-
ness could help build widespread support for transformative action. 
And greater engagement in decision-making institutions, whether 
legislative or administrative, will decrease the likelihood of capture 
and reduce the influence of vested interests.382 Public engagement 
                                                                                                             
 377 See Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 20) (considering the lack of pub-
lic consensus on climate change, “it is not clear that democratization of the [en-
ergy] field will lead to greater action” on climate change). 
 378 See Nadja Popovich et al., How Americans Think About Climate Change, 
in Six Maps, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/03/21/climate/how-americans-think-about-climate-change-in-six-
maps.html (observing that climate change is the type of long-term threat with re-
mote and speculative consequences, for which it is difficult to generate political 
action). 
 379 Cf. Dale W. Jamieson & Marcello Di Paola, Political Theory for the An-
thropocene, in GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 254 (David Held & Pietro Maffetone 
eds., 2016) (observing, among many democratic challenges, that the need to pro-
tect future generations from climate change challenges the theory that democratic 
institutions should serve their constituents). 
 380 See Spence, Naïve Markets, supra note 59, at 1028. 
 381 See id. 
 382 Cf. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular 
Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 290–93 
(1990) (arguing that U.S. history reveals periods in which popular protest has suc-
cessfully overcome control by vested interest groups). 
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through political organizing, interest group pressure, and direct cit-
izen engagement will help hold governmental decision-makers ac-
countable to the public.383 
In addition, notwithstanding the risk of rent-seeking, emerging 
clean energy industries could play a constructive role in mobilizing 
political will for decarbonization.384 Prescriptive policies, like re-
newable portfolio standards, will benefit the clean energy sector in 
ways that could be clearer and more direct than abstract carbon pric-
ing policies.385 As such, the clean energy companies who stand to 
benefit from such policies could help build political will for decar-
bonization and provide a counter-weight to the power of vested fos-
sil fuel interests.386 
                                                                                                             
 383 Frequent calls for energy “democracy” are valuable, but do not necessarily 
reflect this form of public engagement. As Welton has observed, the term energy 
democracy has embraced “pro-sumers” installing their own distributed energy or 
energy efficiency resources or choosing their own energy supply. See Welton, 
supra note 56 (manuscript at 24–34) (describing consumer choice version of “en-
ergy democracy”). See generally Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 523–25 (2016); see also Tomain, supra note 57, at 1138–39 
(describing consumer control). The term energy democracy has also been used to 
describe localized efforts by municipalities to shift supply to renewables and 
adopt green building codes. See Welton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 34–45) (de-
scribing local control variant of energy democracy claims); Tomain, supra note 
57, at 1140–45 (describing benefits of local control over local energy). These cit-
izen efforts are important and will contribute to a clean energy transition. But 
individual and localized action will not be sufficient; state and federal decision-
makers will—and should—continue to develop policies that will have broad im-
pacts on the electricity system. As Welton observes, individual and local action 
does not substitute for steady public engagement in the institutions that will have 
the largest impact on the overall structure of the U.S. electricity system. See Wel-
ton, supra note 56 (manuscript at 57–65) (suggesting that “consumer control” and 
“local control” variants of energy democracy will be insufficient to achieve a 
clean energy transition, and that participation in large-scale state and federal pol-
icymaking will also be necessary). 
 384 See Meckling et al., supra note 330, at 1170–71. 
 385 See id. 
 386 See id. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF COMPLEMENTARY MARKET MECHANISMS IN A 
CLEAN ELECTRICITY TRANSITION 
Given the complexity and scale of the challenges ahead, little is 
gained by exclusive reliance on either markets or regulation.387 As 
Boyd stated in the context of conceptualizing public utility law, we 
need a “normative and conceptual frame for moving beyond the 
false separation of markets and regulation . . . to guide the common, 
collective enterprise of building and elaborating the institutions, reg-
ulatory structures, and business models that will be necessary to re-
alize a low-carbon future.”388 
A. Markets: Complementary Gap-Fillers and Backstops 
Although I argue that government institutions are essential to 
envisioning an effective and equitable transition to a low-carbon fu-
ture, market measures could complement more direct government 
initiatives. Complementary market mechanisms could lessen risks 
arising from governance deficits, provide ongoing incentives to re-
duce emissions (especially emissions that are not directly addressed 
by prescriptive measures), and, in the case of cap-and-trade, could 
provide a backstop in case prescriptive measures fail to achieve ex-
pected reductions. 
As noted above, even government institutions ready to act on 
climate change can be subject to pressure from vested interests that 
might oppose measures directly aimed at them.389 At least for some 
sectors, it might be politically easier to promulgate a general market 
mechanism like cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, rather than more util-
ity- or industry-specific requirements or expectations.  
In addition, if political jockeying leads to piecemeal and incom-
plete governance efforts, with initiatives in some areas but not in 
others, then a carbon price could exert a sector-wide pressure that 
                                                                                                             
 387 Cf. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 1023–24, 1028–30 
(observing that, in energy law, we have accepted a mix of markets and regulation 
in order to capture the benefits and avoid the drawbacks of each). 
 388 Boyd, supra note 2, at 1620. He states further “that the transition to a low 
carbon electricity system over the coming decades can only be realized if it is seen 
as a collective, political choice that aligns technologies, business models, and reg-
ulatory frameworks . . . .” Id. at 1622. 
 389 See supra Section III.F. 
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could fill potential gaps.390 For example, renewable portfolio stand-
ards could direct a transition toward certain forms of energy.391 But 
if certain types of renewables, like distributed generation, are not 
included in the RPS, then a carbon price could continue to incentiv-
ize these additional carbon-reducing initiatives.392 
Both an emissions cap and a carbon tax can “backstop” regula-
tory measures, though in different ways. The cap in a complemen-
tary cap-and-trade program would provide greater certainty in 
achieving a particular level of emissions reductions than planning 
and regulatory measures alone.393 Planning and regulatory measures 
do not usually guarantee a particular emissions reduction, since elec-
tricity sector emissions vary with population, the state of the econ-
omy, and weather patterns.394 If the population of a state increases, 
then emissions could go up even if per capita energy use went 
down.395 And, notwithstanding some progress in decoupling emis-
sions growth and carbon emissions, a robust economy, with more 
commerce and more driving, is still likely to generate higher emis-
sions per capita than a depressed economy.396 An emissions cap 
                                                                                                             
 390 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 75–76. 
 391 See Boyd, supra note 2, at 1669. 
 392 For example, homeowners or businesses can consider the economics of in-
stalling solar or combined heat and power systems a carbon price factored into the 
price of electricity could affect the decision-making calculus. See Boyd, supra 
note 2, at 1700–01. 
 393 See Görlach, supra note 161, at 743 (noting that the cap in the European 
Trading System provides a “safety net in the policy mix, which ensures that emis-
sions stay within the cap, no matter how well or poorly other policy instruments 
perform”); Alice Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants: The Co-Pollutant Implica-
tions of EPA’s Clean Air Act § 111(d) Options for Greenhouse Gases, 32 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 173, 211 (2014) [hereinafter Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants] (ob-
serving that cap-and-trade provides more certainty about reducing emissions lev-
els than performance-rate standards). 
 394 See Swift, supra note 160, at 5 (observing that emissions caps achieve bet-
ter results than prescriptive regulations because they do not allow emissions to 
grow with increased production). 
 395 Kuishuang Feng et al., Drivers of the US CO2 Emissions 1997–2013, 
NATURE COMM. 1, 3 (2015), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms8714. 
 396 According to a recent analysis, between 1997 and 2007, 71% of U.S. car-
bon emissions increases were attributable to economic activity; 29% was attribut-
able to population growth. See id. at 2. From 2007 to 2009, 83% of the decrease 
in US emissions was attributable to the recession; only 17% was attributable from 
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would provide an emissions backstop to contain emissions regard-
less of these factors. Although trading programs to date have estab-
lished relatively weak caps relative to existing trends, the backstop 
function could nonetheless be valuable if external forces would oth-
erwise result in increasing emissions. 
A carbon tax would not provide an emissions backstop, but it 
would provide a continuous incentive for carbon reductions regard-
less of other factors.397 So, for example, if economic growth and as-
sociated emissions decreased, an emissions cap could suddenly be-
come quite lax, leading to low allowance prices and little incentive 
to invest in emissions reductions.398 A carbon tax, in contrast, would 
generate a consistent price signal over time, regardless of fluctua-
tions in economic activity or other factors affecting emission levels. 
Another critical attribute of market-based mechanisms is their 
revenue, revenue that can help finance a transition to clean energy 
and the inevitable cost of adapting to climate change.399 Funds gen-
erated through cap-and-trade programs or a carbon tax could be re-
turned to consumers as a dividend.400 Revenue could also be used to 
                                                                                                             
shifts from coal to natural gas. Id. To achieve long-term decarbonization, eco-
nomic growth and emissions will need to be substantially decoupled. 
 397 See Kaswan, California Lawsuits, supra note 350, at 36–37. 
 398 See Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants, supra note 393, at 210–11 (ob-
serving that decreases in demand could result—and have resulted—in lax emis-
sions caps that fail to drive the adoption and development of pollution controls). 
Low-allowance prices could result from multiple causes, not limited to economic 
recession; a detailed study of low-allowance prices in the EU ETS could identify 
causation for only 10% of the price drop, with 90% unexplained. See Nicolas 
Koch et al., Causes of the EU ETS Price Drop: Recession, CDM, Renewable Pol-
icies, or a Bit of Everything?–New Evidence, 73 ENERGY POL’Y 676, 684 (2014). 
Of the 10% deemed explainable, economic recession was the most important 
driver. See id. 
 399 While the effect of the RGGI cap-and-trade program on emissions is un-
clear, the program has generated 2.7 billion dollars in auction revenue, some of 
which was devoted to energy efficiency and renewable energy investments, pro-
vided important indirect greenhouse gas mitigation benefits. See JONATHAN L. 
RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41836, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 (2017) (discussing 
auction revenue) and 12 (noting allocation of auction revenue). 
 400 See Amy Sinden, Revenue-Neutral Cap and Trade, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10944, 10945 (2009). 
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finance investments in clean energy.401 And revenue could be used 
to address the equity implications of the transition, by providing div-
idends to help poor households pay increasing energy costs, or by 
improving energy efficiency in low-income households, or by ex-
tending the benefits of clean energy to disadvantaged communi-
ties.402 In addition, carbon revenue could help finance adaptation 
measures, like preparing or relocating vulnerable communities.403 
And, although this Article does not attempt to address federalism 
issues generally, it is worth noting that a federal carbon price could 
stimulate prescriptive measures at the state level.404  Instead of de-
pressing state action, a federal carbon price could motivate states to 
develop strategies that shape how their generators, utilities, and con-
sumers will be affected by that price. States that might not have 
taken climate action on their own might respond to a federal carbon 
price by initiating a range of measures designed to ensure that state 
actors benefit from rather than being disadvantaged by the federal 
carbon price. In other words, they might have a new incentive to 
encourage and facilitate low-carbon generation, so as to maximize 
economic benefits and avoid the costs of continued reliance on high-
carbon sources. 
                                                                                                             
 401 See RAMSEUR, supra note 399, at 12 (noting that 8% of revenue generated 
through the RGGI program has been used to develop clean and renewable energy). 
 402 Allowance auctions in the RGGI program have generated 2.7 billion dol-
lars, much of which has been invested n energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
See RAMSEUR, supra note 399, at 10 (revenue generated) and 12 (allocation of 
revenue). Although a smaller proportion of allowances are auctioned in Califor-
nia’s cap-and-trade program in comparison with RGGI, as of September 2017, 
California’s auctions have generated over five billion dollars in auction revenue 
for the state. Table: California Cap-and-Trade Program, Summary of Proceeds 
to California and Consigning Entities, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.
gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/proceeds_summary.pdf (last updated Sept. 2017). 
35% of the revenue is designated to benefit disadvantaged communities, and re-
maining revenue includes support for high-cost mitigation measures, like high-
speed rail to reduce transportation emissions. See infra note 479 and accompany-
ing text (describing California’s use of auction revenue). 
 403 See Heather McGray, Fact Sheet: The Role of Adaptation, WORLD RES. 
INST.: INSIGHTS (May 18, 2009), http://www.wri.org/blog/2009/05/fact-sheet-
role-adaptation (observing the importance of establishing cap-and-trade to create 
a source of revenue for adaptation). 
 404 See generally Boyd & Carlson, supra note 58, at 891 (observing that fed-
eral “nudges” could help encourage states to take steps that serve national goals). 
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So, notwithstanding the importance of government engagement, 
a carbon price, whether through a cap-and-trade program or a carbon 
tax, can help motivate change (especially if more direct government 
efforts are lackluster), fill gaps in direct governance approaches, and 
provide a backstop to ensure continued reductions. 
B. The Incompatibility of Markets and Prescriptive          
Regulations Revisited 
As noted above, market advocates not only tout the benefits of 
market mechanisms, they suggest that, except under limited circum-
stances, coupling prescriptive measures with market measures 
would be redundant and could undermine market measures’ asserted 
cost-effectiveness and innovation benefits.405 Because concerns 
about the potential negative effects of prescriptive measures on mar-
ket measures could chill willingness to take prescriptive initia-
tives,406 it is critical to unpack the arguments to determine the degree 
to which prescriptive and market measures can work together, in-
stead of at cross-purposes, to prompt fundamental decarboniza-
tion.407 
1. MARKETS, PRESCRIPTIVE REGULATIONS, AND REDUNDANCY 
Although a combination of market and prescriptive measures 
may result in some redundancy, that redundancy could help avoid 
the inevitable risk that a single policy instrument could fail to 
achieve its intended objective.408 As explored above, at least at pre-
sent, policymakers appear reluctant to establish carbon prices high 
                                                                                                             
 405 See supra Section II.A.3. 
 406 See Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 27–28) (discussing degree to 
which prescriptive measures in Europe and Australia may be chilled by concerns 
about the relationship between such measures and market mechanisms). 
 407 Driesen argues that carbon taxes are more compatible with prescriptive 
measures than cap-and-trade. See id. (manuscript at 45–46). In this Article, I note 
potential interactions without taking a position on the relative desirability of dif-
fering market mechanisms. 
 408 See, e.g., Görlach, supra note 161, at 737–39. Scholars have long debated 
the benefits and drawbacks of redundancy in the federalism context, where poten-
tially overlapping federal and state controls are at issue. The “safety net” argument 
has featured prominently as a justification for allowing states to continue to regu-
late notwithstanding the emergence of parallel federal authority. See, e.g., Kirsten 
H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 
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enough to induce decarbonization.409 If so, prescriptive measures 
that map out the pathway are not merely “redundant,” they are likely 
to be necessary.410 At the same time, however, prescriptive measures 
could fail to be sufficiently comprehensive or could simply remain 
unfulfilled, as has occurred under many environmental statutes.411 
With the potential risks of unfulfilled prescriptive measures in mind, 
a market mechanism, even if weak, could provide at least a partial 
safety net.412 As discussed in Section II.A.1, the cap in a cap-and-
trade program would constrain emissions, while a carbon tax would 
provide at least some level of ongoing financial incentive for emis-
sions reductions.413 When there is no perfect solution, in theory or 
in practice, some measure of redundancy is desirable. 
2.  MARKETS, PRESCRIPTIVE REGULATIONS,                                     
AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Market advocates suggest that, unless there are market failures, 
market signals alone should drive investment decisions because they 
provide the most cost-effective path to achieving a given goal.414 In 
this view, if market mechanisms are unnecessarily combined with 
prescriptive requirements, the prescriptive requirements will push 
regulated entities to take more expensive paths to achieving the 
same goal, increasing the cost of achieving the goal and undermin-
ing the cost-effectiveness benefits of the contemporaneous market-
based program.415 
In principle, lowering the costs of carbon reduction is a valuable 
objective. Lower costs not only help industry; they reduce the im-
pact on the poor, and could also lead policymakers to accept more 
                                                                                                             
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161, 178–81 (2006) (describing the safety net benefits of re-
taining state regulatory authority alongside federal authority). 
 409 See supra notes 328–31 and accompanying text. 
 410 See Jenkins, supra note 144, at 468; see also Alice Kaswan, Why a Cap-
and-Trade System Needs a Regulatory Backstop, CPRBLOG (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=56F58E4B-D5FD-
4FDB-7CFE8D1838C2AADA [hereinafter Kaswan, Regulatory Backstop]. 
 411 See Kaswan, Regulatory Backstop, supra note 410. 
 412 See Görlach, supra note 161, at 743–44. 
 413 See supra Section II.A.1. 
 414 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 415 See id. 
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demanding carbon reduction efforts.416 Nor should prescriptive ap-
proaches ignore cost-effectiveness. For example, requiring costly 
carbon capture-and-storage for existing coal-fired power plants 
would be an expensive path that could further entrench coal, imped-
ing rather than serving a long-term transition. 
But, as scholars have observed, a narrow focus on cost-effec-
tiveness could undermine other policy goals. First, a focus on cost-
effectiveness does not consider the full societal costs and benefits of 
energy choices—in economic-speak, it does not consider their 
broader allocative efficiency. Second, incentivizing short-term cost-
effective mechanisms could delay investments in necessary but 
higher-cost long-term investments, ultimately undermining or in-
creasing the cost of decarbonization. 
Market mechanisms are cost-effective because they encourage 
regulated entities to take the measures that cost them the least, but 
that “cost-effectiveness” does not necessarily maximize allocative 
efficiency because a carbon-based price signal does not account for 
the broader environmental and economic costs and benefits of en-
ergy choices.417 A carbon price based solely on greenhouse gas re-
duction goals does not reflect or build in benefits like reductions in 
co-pollutants, enhanced energy security, an effective pathway to 
long-term reductions, employment opportunities in new industries, 
or other benefits.418 Görlach concludes “that a single-dimensional 
understanding of optimality, which focuses only on the cost-effec-
tiveness of policy instruments, is inadequate.”419 
                                                                                                             
 416 See supra notes 99, 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 417 See Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 11–13). 
 418 See id. (manuscript at 12–13); Görlach, supra note 161, at 735–36; Kas-
wan, Industrial Pollution, supra note 273, at 57–58 (citing economist James 
Boyce’s assertion that the goal of “efficiency” should not focus solely on cost 
minimization, it “should seek to maximize net social benefits from reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions”); see also SOVACOOL ET AL., supra note 75, at 21–22 
(observing that energy choice require critical tradeoffs and suggesting that justice 
principles should guide such choices). Economists often focus on optimizing a 
single variable as a matter of principle, arguing that it is not possible to find an 
“optimal” solution where multiple goals are at stake. See Görlach, supra note 161, 
at 736–37. However, in the real world, decision-makers are juggling the multiple 
variables and implications of prescriptive or incentive-based mechanisms. 
 419 See Görlach, supra note 161, at 736. 
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In addition, a narrow “cost-effectiveness” inquiry generally con-
siders only the short-term cost to regulated entities, like the costs of 
closing down existing fossil fuel plants and investing in new renew-
ables. In the long-term, transitioning to clean energy could lead to a 
wide range of long-term economic benefits to new energy-generat-
ing companies as well as to other economic sectors that contribute 
to green technology, operations, and implementation.420 These ben-
efits may not all accrue to the regulated entity, but they are systemic 
economic benefits that could justify prescriptive approaches that ap-
pear, when focusing only on short-term impacts to the regulated en-
tity, to be less cost-effective than the actions taken in response to a 
price signal. 
Privileging cost-effectiveness not only unduly narrows the pol-
icy inquiry, it could impede efforts to achieve a deep transformation. 
As Driesen’s work has made clear, market mechanisms are consid-
ered cost-effective because they incentivize regulated entities to pur-
sue low-cost solutions and spare them from high-cost invest-
ments.421 However, if these cost-savings features do not provide suf-
ficient incentives for deep transformation, market measures could 
be ineffective—and in some cases more costly—at achieving long-
term and multifaceted goals like deep decarbonization.422 
                                                                                                             
 420 See TOMAIN, supra note 107, at 90–91; WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 
8. Williams’s study notes that the benefits of a clean energy economy are likely 
to be spread more broadly than the benefits of a fossil-fuel based economy, which 
concentrated benefits in a few industries. Id. 
 421 David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10094, 10094 (2003). 
 422 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; David Driesen, Is Emissions 
Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Con-
trol/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 334–35 (1998) 
[hereinafter Driesen, Replacing the Command and Control]; Driesen, supra note 
22 (manuscript at 39) (noting that “trading can reduce pressures on high cost 
sources to innovate to escape high abatement costs”); see also id. (manuscript at 
40) (noting that “[h]igh cost innovation may prove very important to addressing 
long-term environmental problems like climate disruption”); Roberts, supra note 
75. Williams and his co-authors observe that decarbonization often requires mul-
tiple coordinated steps, some of which may be low-cost but others of which may 
be high-cost; initiating only the low-cost steps would fail to achieve a well-inte-
grated and efficient transformation. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81; see also 
Meckling et al., supra note 330, at 1171 (observing the prescriptive measures 
“may avoid future costs[] by speeding up progress toward more ambitious emis-
sion cuts”). 
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For example, recent greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs 
have allowed the use of carbon offsets, which let regulated entities 
cover their emissions with offsets from reductions occurring in un-
regulated sectors.423 Instead of reducing emissions or investing in 
energy alternatives, a power company could save money by pur-
chasing offsets from, say, a forest preservation project.424 While 
such an opportunity would, at least theoretically, achieve the same 
emissions reductions at a cheaper cost, it would fail to prompt the 
more transformative actions necessary to achieve decarboniza-
tion.425 Similarly, if a carbon price led utilities or power companies 
to convert coal plants to natural gas combustion or to invest in new 
natural gas plants, that might be more cost-effective than investing 
in new renewables and the transmission necessary to access them, 
but such actions could delay—if not prevent—decarbonization by 
2050.426 If short-term cost-effective measures lead to long-lived in-
vestments that lock in reliance on fossil fuels or other problematic 
technologies, then policies that privilege short-term cost-effective-
ness could significantly hamper long-term objectives and impose 
higher long-term costs.427 Again, this is not to say that prescriptive 
                                                                                                             
 423 See generally JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34436, 
THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 1–2 (2008); see JONATHAN L. 
RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41836, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14–15 (2017) (de-
scribing the RGGI offset program and noting that an earlier federal cap-and-trade 
proposal would have allowed a very high percentage of offsets); see Compliance 
Offset Program, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capand-
trade/offsets/offsets.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2017); Use of International Credits 
| Climate Action, EURO. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cred-
its_en (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). 
 424 See CAL. AIR RESEARCH BD., COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL: U.S. 
FOREST PROJECTS 1 (2015), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/proto-
cols/usforest/forestprotocol2015.pdf. 
 425 In considering the possibility of global offsets, one commentator has 
stated: “Cap-and-trade will not get us into a different world; it’ll get us planting 
more eucalyptus trees in Brazil.” Matthew Yi, Dems, Governor Spar Over Road 
to Clean Air / Resources Board’s Beefed-Up Staff at Center of Tug-of-War, S.F. 
CHRON. (July 17, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Dems-
governor-spar-over-road-to-clean-air-2581201.php. 
 426 See DEYETTE ET AL., supra note 69, at 15–16. 
 427 See supra note 422 and accompanying text. 
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measures will necessarily avoid these pitfalls; instead, it is to recog-
nize that undirected price signals create a risk of short-sighted in-
vestments. 
Higher short-term investment costs may be a necessary attribute 
of decarbonization, even if they are not the cheapest way to reduce 
emissions at a given point in time.428 Thus, although studies indicate 
that prescriptive measures like RPS may cost more per ton than an-
ticipated carbon prices under cap-and-trade,429 an RPS could better 
facilitate a transition to clean energy than sole reliance on a carbon 
price designed to induce the lowest cost measures, measures which 
might not lead to transformative changes in electricity supply.430 
3.  MARKETS, PRESCRIPTIVE MEASURES, AND INNOVATION 
One of the key attributes of market mechanisms is their “inno-
vation incentive,” which, in this context, means that a carbon price 
gives electricity sector players the incentive to take transformative 
steps toward decarbonization.431 If prescriptive measures are cou-
pled with cap-and-trade programs, however, it is possible that the 
prescriptive measures will drive emission reductions that reduce the 
demand for allowances, which would reduce allowance prices, and 
                                                                                                             
 428 See id. (manuscript at 40) (noting that “a tension exists between maximiz-
ing near-term cost effectiveness and long-term technological development”); Gör-
lach, supra note 161, at 735, 743. 
 429 See supra notes 154 to 156 and accompanying text (describing studies 
comparing carbon reduction costs under RPSs versus cap-and-trade). 
 430 Boyd suggests that policymakers understood that renewable energy might 
not be competitive with other sources and initially designed RPSs to address the 
fear that higher-cost renewables might otherwise not be competitive in the power 
markets that emerged from the 1990s deregulatory efforts. See Boyd, supra note 
2, at 1669. In practice, renewables, once built, are competitive with fossil fuels on 
the power markets. Because renewables have low operating costs and the sources 
with the lowest marginal costs are dispatched first, renewable supplies are, in fact, 
frequently relied upon before fossil fuel sources. However, as discussed above, 
basing payments on marginal operating costs makes it difficult for generators to 
recover their much larger capital costs, so success in power markets does not guar-
antee adequate investment. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing 
new generators’ financing challenges given the wholesale market price structure). 
Of course, a carbon price would improve the viability of renewables, but, as dis-
cussed above, the “push” is unlikely to be sufficient. See supra note 329 and ac-
companying text. 
 431 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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which would ultimately weaken the innovation incentive.432 For ex-
ample, prescriptive regulations in California have led to significant 
emissions reductions, leading to little demand for allowances and 
contributing to the state’s low allowance prices.433 
This risk is, however, remediable. A price floor, as adopted in 
some trading programs, could facilitate the compatibility of pre-
scriptive regulations and cap-and-trade by maintaining a minimum 
price to encourage market-driven innovation.434 And this risk to in-
novation incentives exists only with cap-and-trade; because a carbon 
tax persists unchanged regardless of the role of prescriptive 
measures, it would continue to provide innovation incentives. 
Moreover, market mechanisms are not the only way to induce 
innovation. Market advocates often compare market mechanisms to 
one type of prescriptive mechanism: technology-based performance 
standards that set specific emission rate limitations based on the 
agency’s assessment of available control technologies in a particular 
industry,435 a mechanism that, at least in practice, tends not to en-
courage technological innovation.436 
But, as the foregoing discussion of potential governance mech-
anisms suggests, prescriptive regulations come in many forms and 
often provide substantial innovation incentives.437 An outright ban 
                                                                                                             
 432 See supra notes 157 to 158 and accompanying text. 
 433 See Chris Busch, Comment: California’s Cap-and-Trade Program – the 
Crisis That Wasn’t, CARBON PULSE (Aug. 2, 2016, 4:56 AM), http://carbon-
pulse.com/22969/ [hereinafter Busch, The Crisis That Wasn’t]. 
 434 See Adam Whitmore, On Climate Change Policy, section 3: Price floors 
and ceilings, https://onclimatechangepolicydotorg.wordpress.com/carbon-pric-
ing/price-floors-and-ceilings/ (last updated Feb. 10, 2017) (listing price floors in 
existing greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs). 
 435 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 111, at 1335–37 (noting draw-
backs to technology-based “command and control” regulations). Recognizing the 
multiplicity of types of prescriptive requirements also generates a response to the 
argument that market-based control mechanisms reduce the government’s infor-
mation burden relative to command-and-control regulations. While technology-
based standards unquestionably place a high informational burden on agencies, 
general performance standards, bans, and phase-outs do not; they leave the burden 
of reaching the goal to the regulated sector. 
 436 See id. at 1336. 
 437 See Driesen, Replacing the Command and Control, supra note 422, at 297–
99; Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 38). Tomain describes the complex web 
that fosters innovation, including incentives like market mechanisms, prescriptive 
requirements like standards, in addition to government-supported research, tax 
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or phase-out of unsustainable sources, such as coal-fired power, 
would create a direct and strong incentive to develop alternative 
generation sources and reduce electricity demand.438 Overarching 
performance standards, like an RPS requiring 25% renewables by a 
certain year, are likely to promote, not stifle, innovation as the reg-
ulated sectors innovate to meet the percentage requirement. Gener-
ators will be incentivized because they know there will be a market 
if they develop renewables to satisfy the relevant RPSs. Similarly, a 
requirement to achieve a certain level of energy efficiency creates 
an incentive to develop new and more effective mechanisms to 
achieve energy efficiency.439 This is not to say that such efforts 
would be easy to enact or that they would even succeed; environ-
mental law is rife with unfulfilled statutory mandates.440 The point 
is that prescriptive measures, as well as market signals, have the ca-
pacity to incentivize innovation. The ability of prescriptive regula-
tions to drive transformation is evident in the role they have played 
in states and countries that combine trading programs with market 
mechanisms. One analyst suggests that reductions in Canada’s pro-
jected emissions have been driven primarily by Ontario’s ban on 
coal-fired power and by a “clean electricity” regulation that led Brit-
ish Columbia to cancel two coal-fired power plants and a gas plant, 
                                                                                                             
incentives, and other programs. TOMAIN, supra note 107, at 103–04. Similarly, 
Liscow and Karpilow explain that private-sector innovation tends to build incre-
mentally on itself and that the private sector is likely to require direct measures—
including support—to invest in more transformative measures. Liscow & 
Karpilow, supra note 135, at 387, 404–22. 
 438 As noted above, regulators in Washington state negotiated a phase-out of 
the state’s coal-fired power plant. See MACBETH ET AL., supra note 66, at 43. And 
California banned generation and imports from sources with emissions above 
those from natural gas plants, effectively banning future coal-fired power. See 
infra note 462 and accompanying text. 
 439 More rigid “command and control” requirements, like building codes or 
appliance standards, might emerge from the general prescriptive goal, but the 
presence of an overarching and increasing energy efficiency target creates an in-
centive to develop new mechanisms that could be embodied in regulations over 
time. 
 440 See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Cre-
ative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 300–05 
(1999). 
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not by some Canadian states’ market-based approaches.441 In Cali-
fornia, one observer has stated that “California’s suite of perfor-
mance standards – such as efficiency standards for buildings and 
appliances, the renewable electricity standard for utilities, and the 
low carbon fuel standard for transportation fuels – are principally 
responsible for falling emissions.”442 
Thus, innovation incentives are an important attribute for cli-
mate policy, and to the degree prescriptive measures risk dampening 
contemporaneous market mechanisms, a price floor can forestall 
that risk. Furthermore, market measures do not hold a monopoly on 
innovation; while prescriptive measures would presumably repre-
sent certain key policy decisions, they can nonetheless retain ample 
space for innovation. 
4. THE RISK THAT TRADING COULD DAMPEN PRESCRIPTIVE 
MEASURES’ ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 
The compatibility question concerns not only the impact of pre-
scriptive measures on market mechanisms, but the impact of market 
mechanisms on prescriptive measures. The benefits of a prescriptive 
program could potentially be diluted by participation in a multi-sec-
tor or multijurisdictional trading program.443 The emissions reduc-
tions achieved by the prescriptive regulations could be translated 
into emissions allowances that could then lead to an increase in 
emissions in other sectors or jurisdictions.444 This risk has been aptly 
named the “waterbed effect”: If you press down in one spot, the wa-
ter (emissions) could simply shift to another spot, leaving overall 
                                                                                                             
 441 See Jaccard, supra note 329. 
 442 Busch, The Crisis That Wasn’t, supra note 433. 
 443 Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 24–25). 
 444 See id. In the context of the European Union’s climate policy, which in-
cludes a renewables goal, an energy efficiency goal, and a trading program, 
Stavins argues that the reductions achieved in the energy sector by the renewables 
and efficiency requirements will drive down emissions in those sectors, leaving 
more low-cost allowances available for sources in other sectors, who are then 
likely to forego reductions and purchase allowances. As a result, the renewables 
and efficiency mandates would not lead to any additional reductions beyond the 
cap. See Stavins, Will Europe Scrap Its Renewables Target?, supra note 22. 
2018] ENERGY, GOVERNANCE, AND MARKET MECHANISMS 567 
 
emissions the same and discouraging innovation in the allowance-
purchasing sector or jurisdiction.445 
Driesen provides a compelling example in a multijurisdictional 
program. Holland put its plans to close down its coal-fired power 
plants on hold when it recognized that such closures would generate 
a large quantity of emissions allowances that might then be sold and 
result in continued carbon emissions elsewhere in the European Un-
ion.446 The sale of allowances from Holland’s facility closures 
would not jeopardize Europe’s overarching cap, but Holland’s pre-
scriptive approach would have less of an impact than they might 
have intended.447 Although Holland would be pursuing a clean en-
ergy future, the sale of the resulting allowances could dampen the 
incentive for other European participants to do likewise.448 
Conversely, however, the ability to sell allowances could in-
crease a jurisdiction’s incentive to shut down its coal-fired facilities. 
In the Holland example, if the prescriptive requirements were im-
posed within the context of a trading program, then the Dutch could 
sell the extra allowances generated by shutting down coal plants, 
which would help finance the transition and create an incentive for 
other countries to do likewise.449 
In addition, if a regulating jurisdiction did not want their reduc-
tions to be diluted through sale of extra allowances, it is possible to 
design a trading program that lets participating jurisdictions retire 
some or all of the “extra” allowances: those allowances representing 
reductions beyond the reductions expected of that jurisdiction.450 
                                                                                                             
 445 See Machiel Mulder, Univ. of Groningen, The Waterbed Effect, FUTURE 
LEARN, https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/energy-transition/4/steps/240990 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2018). 
 446 See Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 1–3, 24–25). 
 447 See id. (manuscript at 24–25). 
 448 See id. (manuscript at 3). 
 449 See id. (manuscript at 25). Driesen implies that the ability of Dutch indus-
tries to profit from allowance sales might have facilitated the initial plan to shut-
down coal-fired power plants. Id. 
 450 The European Union is addressing allowance surpluses by establishing a 
“market stability reserve” to take surplus allowances out of circulation. Market 
Stability Reserve |Climate Action, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/reform_en (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Market Stability 
Reserve]; see also Driesen, supra note 22 (manuscript at 28) (noting that a juris-
diction could withhold extra allowances to dampen the waterbed effect); Alice 
Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? The Question of State Stringency, 1 
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Other strategies to maintain emission reduction incentives include 
allowance price floors that maintain a price signal to encourage re-
ductions even if there is a large supply of allowances.451 
The waterbed effect could also occur where a single jurisdiction 
adopts a multi-sector trading program.452 If prescriptive regulations 
cover only some sectors (like electricity or fuels), then those sectors 
could generate extra allowances that become available to unregu-
lated sectors, dampening incentives to reduce emissions in sectors 
that are not covered by prescriptive regulations. For example, Cali-
fornia has adopted numerous prescriptive measures to reduce energy 
and transportation sector measures, measures that are largely re-
sponsible for reductions to date.453 Reductions in the energy and 
transportation sectors could make allowances easily available to in-
dustrial sources, sources which have faced fewer prescriptive carbon 
reduction requirements.454  As a result, the success of measures in 
the energy and transport sectors could lead to relatively few reduc-
tions in the industrial sector.455 
                                                                                                             
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 103, 125 (2009) (noting that, if a sub-juris-
diction seeks to reduce emissions by more than expected by a larger jurisdiction’s 
program, it must retire extra allowances). 
 451 See Whitmore, supra note 434 and accompanying text (describing price 
floors and allowance reserves designed to maintain allowance prices and avoid 
surplus allowances). 
 452 See Görlach, supra note 161, at 741–42. 
 453 See id. 
 454 See Kaswan, California Lawsuits, supra note 350, at 7–9 (observing that 
the state has adopted more prescriptive measures for the electricity and transpor-
tation sectors than for industry). In recent years, the state has adopted some limited 
measures controlling methane releases from oil and gas operations. Update In-
formative Digest: Regulation for Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Crude 
Oil and Natural Gas Facilities, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.gov/re-
gact/2016/oilandgas2016/oguid.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2017). 
 455 Although a multiplicity of factors can affect a given sector’s emission lev-
els, it is worth noting that, between 2007 and 2015, emissions in California’s more 
regulated sectors, transportation and electricity, dropped substantially, while less-
regulated industrial emissions remained flat. CAL. AIR RESEARCH BD., 2017 
EDITION: CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2 (2017), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_2015/ghg_inven-
tory_trends_00-15.pdf (chart indicating relative shifts in sectoral emissions). Eco-
nomic growth during the period suggests that industrial emissions per unit of out-
put did go down, see id. at 9, but the difference in trends raises the possibility that 
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Awareness of the waterbed effect could and should shape gov-
ernment measures to control emissions. Policymakers will need to 
take the “waterbed effect” into account when determining how to 
address all significant sectors moving toward decarbonization. And, 
if prescriptive measures do not appear appropriate for all of these 
sectors, then other means for maintaining a carbon price sufficient 
to incentivize reductions, like price floors, will likely be necessary. 
C. Energy Planning and Regulation Coupled with 
Complementary Market Mechanisms: The California Example 
The viability of combined prescriptive and market-based ap-
proaches is not purely theoretical. Europe, Canada, and several 
states have taken combined approaches.456 Here, I focus on Califor-
nia’s multifaceted approach, which combines a wide range of plan-
ning and prescriptive approaches with a complementary cap-and-
trade program. The California legislature has passed numerous bills 
affirmatively shaping the state’s energy strategy and designed to 
achieve a wide range of environmental, social, and economic objec-
tives. Although the state has developed a greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade program, legislative and agency requirements remain the pri-
mary drivers in the energy sector. In the energy sector, the cap-and-
trade program serves as a complementary measure that provides an 
emission “backstop” as well as revenue to fund a number of the 
                                                                                                             
the additional reductions achieved in the electricity and transportation sectors sup-
ported on-going emissions in the industrial sector. 
 456 See Elisa Morgera et al., The EU’s Climate and Energy Package: Environ-
mental Integration and International Dimensions 2 (Edinburgh Europa Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 07, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1711395 (discussing the European Union’s combination of mechanisms 
to achieve emission reduction targets); Jaccard, supra note 329 (describing nu-
merous countries or states that combine prescriptive and pricing mechanisms); 
Roberts, supra note 75 (describing Ontario’s multi-faceted climate policy); 
MACBETH ET AL., supra note 66, at 4, 9, 12, 15, 17, 27, 28, 35, 39 (indicating that 
the states with carbon trading policies, including the states participating in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California, also have a range of other 
energy sector climate policies); see generally Lori Snyder Bennear & Robert N. 
Stavins, Second-Best Theory and the Use of Multiple Policy Instruments, 37 
ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 111 (2007) (observing that many environmental pricing 
schemes also include supplementary measures). 
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state’s ambitious energy transition goals.457 Although other states 
could make different choices, and California still has a long way to 
go to achieve decarbonization, the California experience provides at 
least a snapshot of an integrated prescriptive and market-based ap-
proach. 
1. SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY MIX 
California’s clean energy programs pre-date the recent prolifer-
ation of climate-driven measures. The California Energy Commis-
sion established a Renewable Energy Program in 1998, and by 2002 
the state’s energy agencies established an initial goal of increasing 
renewables to 20% of the state’s supply by 2017.458 Through admin-
istrative and legislative goal-setting, the state intensified its renew-
able energy goals, culminating in 2015, when the state adopted the 
goal of achieving 50% renewables by 2030.459 In addition to pro-
moting renewable energy, the state has promoted consumer energy 
efficiency since the 1970s and features a multitude of programs for 
improving efficiency, including building and appliance standards.460 
Going beyond already-high energy efficiency standards, in 2015, the 
state established a goal of doubling energy efficiency by 2030.461 In 
                                                                                                             
 457 It is worth noting that ARB has stated that the “cap-and-trade program will 
complement other measures for entities within covered sectors.” See CAL. AIR 
RESEARCH BD., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 31, 35 (2008), https://www.arb.
ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf [hereinafter 2008 
SCOPING PLAN]. In other words, ARB has treated the other measures as the central 
programs, to be complemented by cap-and-trade, rather than the other way 
around. 
 458 See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, History of California’s Renewable Energy 
Programs, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/history.html (last visited Apr. 
2, 2017). 
 459 See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, Renewables Portfolio Standard, 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Re-
newables Portfolio Standard]. The 50% renewables by 2030 goal was established 
by S.B. 350 in 2015. See S.B. 350 § 20(b)(2)(B), 2015–2016, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2016); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b)(2)(B) (2016). 
 460 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, REGULATING ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A 
PRIMER ON THE CPUC’S ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS (Feb. 2016), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/News_
Room/Fact_Sheets/English/Regulating%20Energy%20Efficiency%200216.pdf. 
 461 Cal. S.B. 350 § 6(c)(1). 
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2006, California effectively precluded reliance on new heavily-pol-
luting coal-fired power by adopting an electricity-sector emissions 
performance standard that prohibits new commitments to energy 
from sources that emit more than a combined-cycle natural gas 
power plant.462 
California adopted its landmark comprehensive climate change 
statute, AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, in 2006.463 The 
statute directed the state’s Air Resources Board (ARB) to develop a 
comprehensive scoping plan to reduce the state’s “emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020.”464 Working with agencies throughout California’s 
government and with public engagement throughout the state, ARB 
developed a multifaceted scoping plan that explored reduction op-
portunities and strategies in every sector of the state’s economy.465 
The initial scoping plan called for, and the state ultimately 
adopted, a cap-and-trade program to cover 85% of the state’s emis-
sions, including electricity-sector emissions.466 However, in the 
electricity sector, the cap-and-trade program is complementary to 
the plethora of measures designed to reduce electricity-sector emis-
sions. The scoping plan included agency-initiated measures as well 
as numerous electricity-sector specific laws California has passed to 
reshape the state’s energy sector.467 Since the adoption of AB 32 and 
the implementation of the state’s cap-and-trade program, the Cali-
fornia legislature has continued to guide electricity-sector emissions 
rather than relying on the cap-and-trade program to induce reduc-
tions. As noted above, the state legislature increased the RPS renew-
ables goal to 50% by 2030 and established a goal of doubling the 
                                                                                                             
 462 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (2008); § 8341(d)(1); CAL. ENERGY 
COMM’N, SB 1368 Emission Performance Standards, http://www.energy.ca.gov/
emission_standards/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (describing SB 1368 limits on 
high-carbon generation). 
 463 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq. (2006). 
 464 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (establishing 1990 target) and 
§ 38561(a) (requiring scoping plan). 
 465 See 2008 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 458, at ES-1–ES-3. 
 466 See Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD 
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_over-
view.pdf. 
 467 See 2008 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 458, at 41–45 (describing efficiency 
and renewables measures) and 53 (describing Million Solar Roofs Program). 
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state’s already high energy-efficiency levels by 2030.468 In addition, 
the state requires publicly owned electric utilities to invest in energy 
storage to increase reliability as more intermittent sources, like wind 
and solar, are integrated into the grid.469 
At this stage, most of the energy sector reductions appear to be 
driven by prescriptive requirements rather than by the cap-and-trade 
program’s price signal.470 In 2016, however, the California legisla-
ture adopted a new target: 40% reduction below 1990 levels by 
2030,471 a level much more stringent than the 2020 target, which 
called for reducing to 1990 levels.472 Although prescriptive 
measures, like the ambitious RPS and energy-efficiency goals, will 
continue to be important, the cap-and-trade program is expected to 
drive more of the reductions as the emissions cap tightens.473 In-
creasing electrification of transportation and potential increases in 
air-conditioning to respond to warmer temperatures could increase 
per capita electricity emissions, amplifying the importance of a firm 
cap to constrain emissions growth.474 Despite the trading program’s 
                                                                                                             
 468 See Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 459 and accompanying 
text. 
 469 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2836(a)(1) (2011); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 
§ 9506(a) (2011); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, AB 2514 – Energy Storage System Pro-
curement Targets from Publicly Owned Utilities, http://www.energy.ca.gov/as-
sessments/ab2514_energy_storage.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). 
 470 See Busch, The Crisis That Wasn’t, supra note 433. 
 471 S.B. 32, 2015–16, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 38566 (2016). 
 472 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (2007) (setting 2020 GHG re-
duction target). 
 473 CAL. AIR RESEARCH BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING 
PLAN: THE STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS 
TARGET 109 (Nov. 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_
2017.pdf [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN]. Busch, Carbon Prices 
Rise, supra note 159. California explicitly re-authorized the use of the cap-and-
trade program to meet the new 2030 target. See Melanie Mason & Chris Megerian, 
California Legislature Extends State’s Cap-and-Trade Program in Rare Biparti-
san Effort to Address Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2017, 9:15 PM), 
http://beta.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-climate-change-vote-republi-
cans-20170717-story.html. 
 474 See, e.g., Sara Goudarzi, Increased Use of Air Conditioners to Produce 
More Greenhouse Gas, LIVE SCI. (Aug. 1, 2006, 10:48 AM), https://www.livesci-
ence.com/919-increased-air-conditioners-produce-greenhouse-gas.html (men-
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increasing significance, however, it is clear that the California leg-
islature and California agencies are playing a significant role in 
steering the state’s clean energy transition. 
2. SOCIOECONOMIC GOALS IN CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE POLICY 
California’s greenhouse gas legislation has focused not only on 
the narrow and important task of reducing greenhouse gases, but nu-
merous bills have also explicitly addressed many of the environmen-
tal and socioeconomic implications of the transition to clean energy. 
As discussed below, some of these provisions were embodied in 
general climate legislation, while others focused directly on the elec-
tricity sector. 
a. Multi-faceted Provisions in Economy-Wide Bills 
AB 32, California’s landmark comprehensive climate change 
law, explicitly required the agencies to consider a wide range of en-
vironmental and socioeconomic considerations in deciding the best 
mechanism for reaching its initial 2020 target. The law directs 
CARB, the implementing agency, to ensure that its approach: “min-
imizes costs and maximizes benefits for California’s economy, im-
proves and modernizes California’s energy infrastructure and main-
tains electric system reliability, maximizes additional environmental 
and economic cobenefits for California, and complements the state’s 
efforts to improve air quality.”475 
The law further directs CARB to “[e]nsure that activities under-
taken to comply with [its] regulations do not disproportionately im-
pact low-income communities,”476 and requires CARB to “[c]on-
sider overall societal benefits, including reductions in other air pol-
lutants, diversification of energy sources, and other benefits to the 
economy, environment, and public health.”477 Recognizing that cli-
mate change regulation generates economic opportunities, not just 
                                                                                                             
tioning how temperature changes will require more air conditioning for build-
ings); supra note 312 and accompanying text (discussing increased electricity de-
mands resulting from electrification of transportation and buildings). 
 475 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(h) (2017). 
 476 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (2017). 
 477 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(6). 
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costs, the law requires CARB to “direct public and private invest-
ment toward the most disadvantaged communities in California.”478 
Once CARB decided to adopt a cap-and-trade program as part 
of its greenhouse gas reduction strategy, the California legislature 
again mobilized to steer revenue from emissions allowance auctions 
directly to disadvantaged communities. In 2012, the state legislature 
required that 25% of auction revenue be devoted to climate projects 
that benefit disadvantaged communities, a percentage they increased 
to 35% in 2016.479 Another bill identified the principles defining el-
igible projects, including projects to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions that, to the extent feasible, “[m]aximize economic, environ-
mental, and public health benefits to the state” through jobs, im-
proved air quality, investments in disadvantaged communities, and  
engaging “businesses, public agencies . . . nonprofits, and other 
community institutions . . . .”480 
When the California legislature adopted its ambitious 2030 
emissions reduction commitment, it passed a companion bill, AB 
197, designed to facilitate efforts to integrate greenhouse gas and 
co-pollutant reductions.481 The law requires consolidated reporting 
                                                                                                             
 478 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (2007). 
 479 In 2012, S.B. 535 required that 25% of the available auction revenue be 
used to benefit disadvantaged communities, and that 10% of the available money 
must support projects physically “located within disadvantaged communities.” Id. 
In 2016, the legislature increased the proportion of revenue to disadvantaged com-
munities to 35% and required that 25% fund projects within disadvantaged com-
munities. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39713 (2016). The 2016 legislation 
required that an additional 10% of revenue be used to benefit low-income resi-
dents, due to concern that the definition of “disadvantaged communities” had left 
out many low-income residents who do not reside in communities classified as 
“disadvantaged.” See id.; Emi Wang, Addressing the Climate Gap: California 
Legislature Delivers for Frontline Communities, GREENLINING INST. (Sept. 14, 
2016), http://greenlining.org/blog/2016/addressing-climate-gap-california-legis-
lature-delivers-frontline-communities/. 
 480 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39712(b) (2016). The bill further identi-
fied potentially eligible projects, including improving energy efficiency and dis-
tributed clean energy at universities, public buildings, and industrial sites, funding 
to reduce transportation-related emissions and emissions associated with natural 
resources uses, funding for sustainable infrastructure projects and waste reduc-
tion, and investments in programs and research. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 39712(c). 
 481 Assemb. 197, 2016–2017, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); see generally Alice Kas-
wan, Landmark California Law Links Emissions Reductions and Environmental 
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and publication of greenhouse gases and co-pollutant data.482 In ad-
dition, to address concerns that the emissions trading program could 
limit greenhouse gas reductions (and associated co-pollutant reduc-
tion benefits) in California, the law prioritized “direct emission re-
ductions at large stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions” 
and “from mobile sources.”483 
From a participatory standpoint, California’s climate laws have 
included provisions designed to enhance the voice of historically 
marginalized communities. In 2006, AB 32, the state’s comprehen-
sive climate law, created an Environmental Justice Advisory Com-
mittee to advise the CARB on its climate policies.484 In 2015, AB 
1288 added two new members to the Air Resources Board and spec-
ified that the new members should be people “who work[] directly 
with communities in the state that are most significantly burdened 
                                                                                                             
Justice Goals, CPR BLOG (Sept. 19, 2016), http://progressivere-
form.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=0DC5EEF3-9B02-F46A-54D19E4D60A4E837 
[hereinafter Kaswan, Landmark California Law]. 
 482 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38531(a)(1) (2017). 
 483 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562.5 (a) (2017). The language priori-
tizing direct reductions results from pressure from environmental justice advo-
cates who have long held that California’s adoption of a cap-and-trade program 
undermines the state’s ability to maximize the pollution co-benefits of greenhouse 
gas reductions. See generally Kaswan, California Lawsuits, supra note 350. There 
is considerable uncertainty about how to interpret the prioritization of “direct” 
emission reductions, and what implications the language has for the state’s cap-
and-trade program. See Ann Carlson, SB 32 Passage Great News but Legislature 
Needs to Pass AB 197 Too, LEGAL PLANET (Aug. 23, 2016), http://legal-
planet.org/2016/08/23/sb-32-passage-great-news-but-legislature-needs-to-pass-
ab-197-too/. The law does not appear to rule out cap-and-trade, particularly where 
the trading programs leads to reductions at covered sources; it does, however, 
appear to suggest that carbon offsets are disfavored. See Kaswan, Landmark Cal-
ifornia Law, supra note 481. Thus, this addresses environmental justice advo-
cates’ concerns that the program’s offset provisions, which allow entities reducing 
or sequestering emissions to sell their reductions to entities subject to the cap-and-
trade program, allow the regulated entities to “offset” their emissions rather than 
directly reducing them. See Kaswan, California Lawsuits, supra note 350, at 28–
29. 
 484 Assemb. 32, 2005–2006, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). While the EJAC has ques-
tioned the degree to which CARB heeds and adopts their recommendations, there 
is little question that the EJAC provides a mechanism for organizing and relaying 
the views of disadvantaged communities that would be more difficult to achieve 
without an organized committee. See Kaswan, California Lawsuits, supra note 
350, at 5–6. 
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by, and vulnerable to, high levels of pollution, including, but not 
limited to, communities with diverse racial and ethnic populations 
and communities with low-income populations.”485 Although these 
participatory measures do not guarantee power or control, they re-
flect the recognition that the state’s climate and energy policies will 
have significant implications for the environmental and economic 
well-being of marginalized populations, and provide procedural 
mechanisms for ensuring that these often-neglected views will be 
heard. 
b. Electricity-Sector Bills 
The California legislature has actively guided the state’s clean 
energy pathway and, in doing so, has frequently integrated socioec-
onomic considerations. In 2013, S.B. 43 encouraged utilities to in-
vest in small-scale renewables so that their customers would be able 
to request renewable energy from the utility.486 The law stated that, 
when investing in renewable energy, the utilities should give pref-
erence to renewable energy projects that provide environmental and 
economic benefits to communities afflicted with poverty or high un-
employment, or that suffer from high emission levels of toxic air 
contaminants, criteria air pollutants, and greenhouse gases.487 
S.B. 350, the 2105 legislation which substantially increased the 
state’s renewable portfolio standard and energy efficiency goals, in-
cluded provisions addressing access to renewables and efficiency in 
disadvantaged communities.488 S.B. 350 also called for a compre-
hensive study of the barriers to investing in renewable energy and 
efficiency for low-income customers.489 The law stated that the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission and the Energy Commission should con-
sider “distributed generation to the extent that it provides economic 
and environmental benefits in disadvantaged communities.”490 The 
law encouraged state agencies, as they work to decrease costs and 
increase benefits, to consider technologies with “zero or lowest fea-
sible emissions of greenhouse gases, criteria pollutants, and toxic air 
                                                                                                             
 485 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39510(e) (2017). 
 486 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13(a)(1) (2017). 
 487 PUB. UTIL. § 399.13(a)(7)(A). 
 488 S.B. 350, 2015–2016, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 489 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25327(b)(1) & (2) (2016). 
 490 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 400(a) (2017). 
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contaminants onsite,”491 thereby encouraging a multi-pollutant ap-
proach. 
To enhance participation, notoriously difficult in complex PUC 
administrative proceedings, the law also established an advisory 
group with representatives from disadvantaged communities.492 The 
advisory group is tasked with reviewing clean energy and pollution 
reduction programs and determining “whether [the] proposed pro-
grams will be effective and useful in disadvantaged communi-
ties.”493 
In order to enable poor renters to enjoy the benefits of solar en-
ergy, AB 693 established the “Multifamily Affordable Housing So-
lar Roofs Program.”494 The law dedicates up to one hundred million 
dollars for installing solar power on apartment buildings, with the 
expectation of lowering utility bills for low-income apartments.495 
The bill stated that “[i]nstalling . . . solar energy systems in disad-
vantaged communities can provide local economic development 
benefits while advancing the state’s renewable energy policies and 
policies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.”496 
Lastly, the California legislature passed a law that responds to 
environmental justice concerns that new natural gas power plants 
will end up in disadvantaged communities already subject to heavy 
pollution burdens.497 In 2016, the Legislature adopted AB 1937, 
which directs utilities, in seeking and considering bids for new nat-
ural gas power plants, to avoid bids for gas-fired generating units 
“in communities that suffer from cumulative pollution burdens.”498 
                                                                                                             
 491 PUB. UTIL. § 400(b). 
 492 PUB. UTIL. § 400(g). 
 493 Id. 
 494 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2870(a)(2) (2017). 
 495 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2870(c). Moreover, the law requires that the elec-
tricity “be primarily used to offset electricity usage by low-income tenants” and 
authorizes the agency to require covenants and deed restrictions to ensure that the 
property continues to be rented to low-income residents. PUB. UTIL. § 2870(f)(2). 
 496 Assemb. 693, 2015-2016, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). The law directs the PUC 
to “establish local hiring requirements . . . to provide economic development ben-
efits to disadvantaged communities . . . .” Id. 
 497 Assemb. 1937, 2015–2016, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 498 Id. The law was inspired by a specific siting controversy in California. En-
vironmental justice advocates opposed an effort to build a fourth natural gas 
power plant in Oxnard, California, and sought to prevent such concentrations in 
the future. See CAL. ENVTL. JUST. ALL., 2016 HIGHLIGHTS AND 2017 OUTLOOK 
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As the trend away from coal continues and natural gas prices remain 
low, many anticipate increasing investment in natural gas power 
plants.499 Although the environmental impacts of natural gas com-
bustion are much lower than for coal combustion, natural gas plants 
do contribute to local pollution loads and equitable siting remains a 
concern.500 
The California legislature’s extensive guidance reflects the 
state’s recognition that energy choices will have a multiplicity of 
environmental and economic repercussions, and the state’s recogni-
tion that it can strongly influence the shape of future energy invest-
ments.501 Rather than leaving all decisions to utilities, power com-
panies, and other market players, the state’s renewable energy and 
energy efficiency requirements firmly direct the state toward a long-
term transition to clean energy. Provisions allocating money and op-
portunity to disadvantaged communities help direct the benefits to 
all, in contrast to more laissez-faire approaches, which would more 
likely benefit those wealthy enough to take advantage of new clean 
energy and efficiency technologies.502 Although most states are un-
likely to have the political alignment of green technology and envi-
ronmental justice interests that paved the way for California’s legis-
lative initiatives,503 other states can learn from California’s initia-
tives and draw upon the California experience in developing legis-
lative or administrative policies. 
CONCLUSION 
Decarbonization presents a systemic challenge to our infrastruc-
ture and the institutions that shape it. Although market advocates 
                                                                                                             
3–4 (2016), http://caleja.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2016-Victories-and-
2017-Outlook_-FINAL.pdf. 
 499 Hodge, supra note 339. 
 500 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 8. 
 501 See Kaswan, Landmark California Law, supra note 481. 
 502 See supra note 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 503 See Kaswan, California Lawsuits, supra note 350, at 3–5 (describing the 
role of environmental justice groups in incorporating environmental justice pro-
visions into the state’s comprehensive climate law, AB 32); Alice Kaswan, A Co-
operative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of 
State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENVER L. REV. 791, 796 (2008) (noting 
degree to which support for California’s climate laws has stemmed, in part, from 
expected economic benefits). 
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promote market mechanisms and perceive only a limited role for 
“complementary” prescriptive measures, a carbon price, acting 
alone, cannot drive the ship. Our governing institutions, both legis-
lative and administrative, centralized and decentralized, can give 
shape to a new clean energy economy. In envisioning a long-term 
electricity-sector transition, government decision makers can ad-
dress difficult tradeoffs, consider multiple environmental and soci-
oeconomic implications, and develop long-term roadmaps and path-
ways for change, through processes that are democratically account-
able and include at least some measure of public participation. Of 
course, there is no guarantee that government institutions will rise 
to the challenge, whether through prescriptive or market-based 
measures. Increasing public awareness and engagement will be es-
sential to achieving positive change. 
As government institutions set the course for change, market 
mechanisms can, however, play an important role. The could help 
motivate widespread reductions, fill regulatory gaps, provide at least 
a partial fallback if prescriptive measures prove insufficient, and 
generate revenue to assist consumers and fund mitigation and adap-
tation efforts. Though important, these roles serve to complement, 
not substitute for, public deliberation over the shape of our energy 
future. 
 
